A Comparative Analysis of the Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi Da'wah Movement

Hendar Riyadi
Universitas Muhammadiyah Bandung
hendarriyadi@umbandung.ac.id

Cecep Taufikurrohman
Universitas Muhammadiyah Bandung
ctrahman@umbandung.ac.id

Imas Masturoh
Universitas Islam Darussalam
imasmasturohiaid@gmail.com

Abstract

Muhammadiyah is an Islamic organization that has a very comprehensive organizational structure. It is called comprehensive because Muhammadiyah does not only deal with theological issues, but Muhammadiyah also focuses on social-community issues, especially education, health and social welfare simultaneously. This is what makes Muhammadiyah a very unique movement, because Muhammadiyah is characterized by a movement to purify religious teachings *(tajrid)* in religious belief (*Aqidah* and Worship) which is combined with the principles and spirit of renewal *(tajdid)* in the world affairs. Recently, many people have the view that Muhammadiyah is another form of one of the purification movements that was born in the land of Hijaz, Salafi-Wahhabi. This conclusion is only based on several points of view between Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi in several partial issues. The focus of the study in this paper is the comparison between Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi. The argument in this paper is that Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi are two very different typologies of Islamic movements. This is at least shown by five selective themes that are compared between the two, namely aspects of worldview (aqidah), ethos (ethics), religious views and epistemology of religious thought (manhaj), as well as their responses, especially to the issues of pluralism and gender.

Keywords: *Muhammadiyah, Salafi, Wahhabi, movement, progressive*

Abstrak

Muhammadiyah adalah sebuah organisasi Islam yang memiliki tatanan keorganisasian yang sangat komprehensif. Disebut komprehensif, karena Muhammadiyah tidak hanya mengurusi persoalan teologis, tetapi Muhammadiyah juga fokus kepada persoalan-persoalan sosial-kemasyarakatan, terutama pendidikan, kesehatan dan kesejahteraan sosial secara bersamaan. Hal inilah yang menjadikan Muhammadiyah sebagai pergerakan yang sangat unik, sebab Muhammadiyah berciri khas gerakan purifikasi ajaran agama *(tajrid)* dalam urusan keyakinan agama (Aqidah dan Ibadah) yang dipadukan dengan prinsip dan ruh pembaharuan *(tajdid)* dalam urusan duniawi. Akhir-akhir ini banyak kalangan yang berpandangan, bahwa Muhammadiyah adalah wujud lain dari salah satu gerakan purifikasi yang lahir di tanah Hijaz, yaitu Salafi-Wahhabi. Kesimpulan tersebut hanya didasarkan pada beberapa titik temu antara Muhammadiyah dengan Salafi-Wahabi dalam beberapa persoalan parsial. Fokus studi dalam paper ini adalah perbandingan antara Muhammadiyah dan Salafi-Wahhabi. Argumen dalam paper ini adalah bahwa Muhammadiyah dan Salafi-Wahhabi

merupakan dua tipologi gerakan Islam yang sangat berbeda. Hal ini setidaknya ditunjukkan oleh lima tema selektif yang diperbandingkan antara keduanya, yaitu aspek pandangan dunia (akidah), etos (etika), pandangan keagamaan dan epistemologi pemikiran keagamaan (*manhaj*), serta respons keduanya khususnya isu pluralisme dan isu gender.

Kata Kunci: *Muhammadiyah, Salafi, Wahhabi, gerakan, berkemajuan*

INTRODUCTION

Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi are two Islamic movements that are often misunderstood. Sometimes, both are clashed or separated diametrically: Muhammadiyah is not Salafi-Wahhabi and likewise Salafi-Wahhabi is not Muhammadiyah. However, it is not infrequently either for Muhammadiyah to be identified with Salafi-Wahhabi, as if Muhammadiyah is a manifestation of the Salafi-Wahhabi Movement in Indonesia. Thus, those who do not understand Muhammadiyah's da'wah well, often call it as Wahhabi. This kind of impression is very apparent, especially in the early phases of its establishment, Muhammadiyah was often associated with the Salafi Wahhabi movement. In these early phases, a number of traditionalist scholars, for example, opposed the presence of Muhammadiyah by portraying it as Wahhabi. A fairly clear indication was shown in the first al-Islam Congress in 1921 in Cirebon. In the Congress, a number of traditionalist scholars made negative accusations against Muhammadiyah, which they considered to be Wahhabi.[1] The Muhammadiyah-Wahhabi issue, not only spread in the country, but also spread to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, which at that time was still controlled by the Ottoman Empire in Turkey. Kyai Fachrodin and Kyai Syuja', direct students of Kyai Ahmad Dahlan, testified that in 1922 several scholars from the country who had settled in Mecca and became spies for King Syarif Husein had accused Jam'iyyah Muhammadiyah of being part of the Wahhabi movement.[2]

A century has passed now (1922-2023). The theme of Muhammadiyah and Salafi Wahhabi is still being discussed. Among others, in the Regional Conference of the Tarjih Council in Cirebon (2023). In the previous two decades (2001), the discussion was even more intense. The discourse of Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi, especially associated with the September 11, 2001 attacks that destroyed the two twin towers, the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon, United States. At that time, Wahhabism was considered a religious ideology that inspired and influenced contemporary Islamic puritan theology and was responsible for the birth of various forms of

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[1]Mu'arif, "Mengungkap Fakta-fakta Historis: Muhammadiyah Bukan Wahhabi", in Achmad Jainuri, et.al., *Muhammadiyah dan Wahhabisme, Mengurai Titik Temu dan Titik Seteru,* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2012), p. 124.
[2]Kyai Syuja', *Islam Berkemajuan, Kisah Perjuangan K.H. Ahmad Dahlan dan Muhammadiyah Masa Awal,* (Jakarta: Al-Wasat, 2009), pp. 141-152.

radicalism, extremism and global terrorism.[3] The issue of Wahhabism spread so quickly and brought back the negative and pejorative image of Islam in the Western world.[4] Islam is portrayed as a religion of violence, radicalism, extremism, militancy and accused of being a terrorist religion. This image of Islam has further implications in the relationship between Islam and the West, particularly the increasing suspicion and hatred of Islam (Islamophobia) in the Western world.[5]

The crucial problem is when the issue of Wahhabism is linked to Muhammadiyah. Moreover, Muhammadiyah is also mentioned and equated with the Salafi Wahhabi religious movement. The image that is built is that Muhammadiyah is puritanical, intolerant, radical, and exclusive, conservative in character, and even fundamentalist.[6] This is certainly contrary to the image of Muhammadiyah that has long been built as a modernist, liberal, and progressive[7] Islamic movement with a more tolerant, moderate and inclusive character.[8] Therefore, linking and portraying Muhammadiyah with Wahhabi, not only questioning many theses about the modernity, progressiveness and moderation of Muhammadiyah, but also involving Muhammadiyah in global discourse as part of the radicalism and terrorism movement. So, it is not only depicted as an intolerant and exclusive Salafi, but also considered to be involved in the global radicalism and

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[3]Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremsits,* (Harper San Francisco: HarperCollins Publisher, 2005), p. 45; Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 199-202; Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, (New York: Oxford University Press & American University Press, 2004), pp. 3-4.

[4]The negative and pejorative image of Islam is not a new issue, especially in the history of relations between Islam and the West. For centuries the West has portrayed Islam in a less than favorable light. Voltaire, for example, equated Islam with fanaticism. Montesquieu called Islamic political power tyranny. Francis Bacon defined it as "a monarchy in which there are no noble values at all, a pure and absolute tyranny". Islamic military practices are equated with terror and rape as depicted in Eugène Delacroix's painting, "The Massacre in Chios". While Ernest Renan equated Islamic tradition with backwardness and primitiveness. See, Charles Kurzman, *Liberal Islamic Discourse, Contemporary Islamic Thought on Global Issues*, trans. Bahrul Ulmu (et.al.), (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2003), p. xi.

[5]John L. Esposito, The Future of Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 10-11; Stephen Vertigans, Militant Islam, A Sociology Characteristics, Causes and Consequences, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 27. *USA Today/Gallup Center for Muslim Studies* at 2006 poll found that a substantial minority of Americans admit to feeling prejudice against Muslims and favor tightening security against Muslims as a means of preventing terrorism. In addition, the same poll found that about 44% of Americans say Muslims are too extreme in their religion. Even 22%, a quarter of Americans, say they would not want a Muslim neighbor, and less than half believe that American Muslims are loyal to the United States. John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, It's Time for Muslims to Talk, trans. Eva Y. Nukman, (Bandung: Mizan, 2008), p. 14.

[6]Suaidi Asyari, *Nalar Politik NU & Muhammadiyah,* trans. Mohamad Rapik, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2010), p. 34; M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Dari Puritanisme ke Fundamentalisme: Muhammadiyah Berbalik Arah", in Ali Usman (ed.), *Esai-esai Pemikiran Moh. Shofan dan Refleksi Kritis Kaum Pluralis,* (Jakarta: LSAF dan Ar-Ruzz Media, 2008), pp. 232-239.

[7]See, Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942,* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980); James L. Peacock, *Purifying the Faith: The Muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam,* (California: The Benyamin/Cumming Publishing Company, 1978); Alfian, *Muhammadiyah, The Political Behavior of A Muslim Modernist Organization Under Dutch Colonialism,* (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1989); W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity,* (London: Routledge, 1988); Charles Kurzman, *Wacana Islam Liberal, Pemikiran Islam Kontemporer tentang Isu-isu Global,* terj. Bahrul Ulmu (et.al.), (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2003); Fazlur Rahman, *Islam dan Modernitas tentang Transformasi Intelektual,* (Bandung: Pustaka, 1985); Greag Fealy, *Ijtihad Politik Ulama, Sejarah NU 1952-1967,* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003).

[8]Achmad Jainuri, *Ideologi Kaum Reformis: Melacak Pandangan Keagamaan Muhammadiyah Periode Awal,* (Surabaya: Lembaga Pengkajian Agama dan Masyarakat, 2002), pp. 112-127.

terrorism movement. This is certainly a crucial issue. This discourse clearly requires a deeper study of the relationship between Muhammadiyah and Salafi, especially with Salafi Wahhabi. Is Muhammadiyah Salafi (Wahhabi) or not Wahhabi?

In the earlier study, at least three different views were found. First, the view that firmly states that Muhammadiyah is not Wahhabi or *Wahhiyyat*. This view is represented by Alwi Shihab,[9] Azyumardi Azra[10] and Haedar Nashir.[11] Second, the view that states that Muhammadiyah adheres to the Wahhabi school of thought. This view is represented by Seyyed Hussein Nasr[12] and M. Dawam Rahardjo.[13] Third, the view that states that Muhammadiyah has similarities with Wahhabi in terms of its religious puritanism but differs in terms of the means of spreading its ideas. This view is represented by Suadi Asyari[14] and Sutiyono.[15]

The three views above require in-depth study. Existing studies seem to focus more on the doctrinal and historical aspects. In the author's view, the study of Muhammadiyah and Salafi Wahhabi is not sufficient only through a doctrinal and historical approach. It requires in-depth study from a broader aspect. In this case, the author proposes a selective theme perspective that is relatively representative, first, the aspect of worldview (theology); second, the aspect of ethos

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[9]Alwi Shihab, *Membendung Arus, Respons Gerakan Muhammadiyah Terhadap Penetrasi Misi Kristen di Indonesia,* (Bandung: Mizan, 1998), pp. 129-132.

[10]Azyumardi Azra, "Salafisme Wasathiyah", in *Republika*, 13 October, 2005, p. 12.

[11]See, "Muhammadiyah lâ Wahbiyyah" in Tajuk Rencana *Suara Muhammadiyah*, edition No. 01/Th. Ke-97/1-15 January 2012. Refer too, Haedar Nashir, "Anatomi Gerakan Wahhabiyah", in Achmad Jaenuri, et.al., *Muhammadiyah dan Wahhabisme, Mengurai Titik Temu dan Titik Seteru Paham Wahhabi dan Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2012), p. 28.

[12]Seyyed Hussein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World,* (London: Kegan Paul Internasional, 1987), pp. 81 and 197.

[13]M. Dawam Rahardjo, "Dari Puritanisme ke Fundamentalisme: Muhammadiyah Berbalik Arah", in Ali Usman (ed.), *Esai-esai Pemikiran Moh. Shofan dan Refleksi Kritis Kaum Pluralis,* (Jakarta: LSAF dan Ar-Ruzz Media, 2008), pp. 231-232.

[14]Puritan Islam refers to a group of Muslims who tend to claim that their group is the most correct or adheres to pure Islam and therefore they are responsible for purifying other Muslims who do not adhere to the same Islamic theological understanding and way of worship as they do. Asyari further mentioned—referring to Khaled Aboe El Fadl—the characteristics of the theological attitude of puritan Muslims include a tendency to display "a sense of supremacist hostility towards others" and rejecting the tradition of fiqh, such as the existence of Islamic legal schools of thought. Suaidi Asyari, *Nalar Politik NU & Muhammadiyah, trans.* Mohamad Rapik, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2010), pp. 32, 39.

[15]Sutiyono's interesting study is his thesis on the practice of violent religious movements that are widely accepted by the Senjakarta Klaten Central Java farming community. According to him, there are facts that show that the spread of Muhammadiyah in the Senjakarta farming community, Klaten, Central Java, is often carried out by violent means, such as the destruction of places considered sacred. They also resist syncretic traditional practices that are considered heretical, superstitious and churafat such as *slametan, tahlilan, yasinan, pilgrimage, ngalap berkah*, etc. However, at the same time, Muhammadiyah is actually well received by the community. This finding corrects Clifford Geertz's thesis which states that the radical pattern of Muhammadiyah movements is the cause of the low participation of rural communities (farmers) in this movement. Furthermore, Geertz stated that Islamic puritanism can only enter rural areas if they are tolerant in dealing with syncretic Islamic culture. According to Sutiyono, this thesis does not apply to the Senjakarta farming community, Klaten, Central Java. Sutiyono, *Benturan Budaya Islam: Puritan dan Sinkretis,* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), pp. 9-36, 148.

(ethics); third, the aspect of religious views; fourth, the aspect of epistemology of religious thought (manhaj); and fifth, the aspect of their responses to the contemporary issues, especially the issue of religious pluralism and gender.

METHOD

In the study of the selective themes above, the method used is the comparative method, it is a descriptive method that is comparative between variables/objects studied with more than one sample or different times—in this case comparing Muhammadiyah and Salafi Wahhabi. The data sources used are several primary sources concerning Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah. Several primary sources regarding Wahhabi are taken from the works of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab which are collected in *Mu`allafât Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhâb, including Kitâb al-Tawhîd, Kitâb Kasyâf al-Syubuhât, Kitâb Tsalâtsah al-Ushûl, Kitâb al-Qawâ'id al-Arba', and Kitâb Fadhl al-Islâm,* as well as a collection of fatwas -fatwas of Wahhabi scholars such as *Majmû' Fatâwâ wa Maqâlat al-Mutanawi'at* by Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz. Meanwhile, the primary data sources concerning Muhammadiyah include, *the Progressive Islamic Treatise, Introduction of the Articles of Association, the Statement of Beliefs and Ideals of Muhammadiyah, 7 Philosophies of Teachings and 17 Groups of Verses, Guidelines for the Islamic Life of Muhammadiyah Members, Theology of Amal al-Ma'un, Tanfidz of the One Century Muhammadiyah Congress (46th) on the Statement of Thoughts of the Second Century of Muhammadiyah and Muhammadiyah and Strategic Issues of the Community, Nationality and Universal Humanity, Manhaj Tarjih and Development of Islamic Thought, and Thematic Interpretation of the Quran on Social Relations between Religious Communities, as well as Adabul Mar'ah fi al-Islam, Women's Jurisprudence and the Progressive Women Message.* Data collection was carried out through a literature study of the data sources above. It began with a bibliographic survey. The collected data was recorded, arranged, classified and analyzed as needed. Then, the collected data was processed based on the critical discourse analysis technique. [16]

DISCUSSION

The Concept and History of the Salafi Islamic Movement

The term salafi[17] is generally used to refer to the trend of Islamic movements which specifically focus on the return of pure Islam, which existed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad and follow the footsteps of three generations of pious predecessors *(salaf al-shalih)*, particularly the

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[16]Critical discourse analysis is one of the forms of content analysis that is more qualitative, holistic, interpretive and focuses more on the meaning of hidden (latent) text messages. See, Stefan Titscher (et.al), Text and Discourse Analysis Methods, trans. Gazali (et al.), (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2009), pp. 235-276.

[17]In the Qur'an, the word salafa is interpreted as the previous or the past. Read for example, QS. Al-Baqarah/2: 275; al-Nisa/4: 22-23; al-Maidah/5: 95; al-Anfal/8: 38; al-Zukhruf/43: 56; Yunus/10: 30; and al-Haqqah/69: 24.

generations of the Companions, *Tabi'in* (followers of the Companions) and *Tabi'ut Tabi'in* (Followers of the Tabi'in). This Salafi trend refers to the statement of the Prophet's hadith about the three best generations, there are *qarnî* (generation of the Companions), *Tsuma Alladzina yalûnahum* (then after that, the generation of the *Tabi'in*) and *Tsuma Al-Ladzina yalûnahum* (then after that, the generation of the *Tabi'ut Tabi'in*). [18]

The idea and movement of Salafi Islam have not always been the same (diverse). Azyumardi Azra claims that this trend may be observed in the ideas and behaviors of those who are typically regarded as the forerunners and founders of Salafism, ranging from Muhammad ibn Abdil Wahhab (1703–1792) to Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905). Their treatment of each figure is greatly different from their attempts to persuade Muslims to return to Salafi Islam. Ibn Taimiyah tended to be polemical, Muhammad ibn Abdil Wahhab liked to use violent methods, and Muhammad Abduh liked to use a rational approach. [19] In other distinctions, Ibn Taimiyah tended to develop more independent interpretations and rejected 'blind *taklid*' (blind acceptance) of imitation; Muhammad ibn Abdil Wahhab tended to focus back on the *salâfu al-shâlih* to purify Islam from deviant teachings; while Muhammad Abduh emphasized the focus on the *salafu al-shâlih* to remove elements of religion that were considered backward for the sake of "modernizing" Islam. [20]

In line with Azra, Tariq Ramadan mentioned three variants of Salafi, there are Salafi literalism, Salafi reformism and political literalists Salafism. [21] Quintan Wiktorowicz identified three nearly identical varieties: purist *salafi*, politicos *salafi* and jihadist *salafi*. [22] Meanwhile, Omayma Abdul-Latif mentioned three *salafi* trends that are almost close, first, scientific salafi (*al-salafyia al-elmyia*); second, activist salafi (*al-salafyia al-harakyyia*)—including reformist *salafi* (*al-salafyia al-*

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[18] Muhammad Indad Rabbani, "Salafiyah: Sejarah dan Konsepsi" ("Salafiyah: History and Conception"), in Jurnal Tasfiyah, vol. 1, No. 2, August 2017, p. 246; Mohamed Ali, "Understanding Salafis, Salafism and Modern Salafism", in Jurnal Islâmiyyât 41 (1) 2019, p. 125; Besnik Sinani, "Post-Salafism: Religious Revisionism in Contemporary Saudia Arabia", in Jurnal Religion 2022, 13, 13(4), 340; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13040340.

[19] Azra, "Salafisme Wasathiyah", p. 12.

[20] Read, Oxford Riset Ensiklopedias, "Religion" in https://oxfordre.com/religion/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-255;jsessionid=EE64607912496E4E969AE64DDC024169. Accessed on 20/02/2023.

[21] See, Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 25-27. In Abdullah Saeed's categories, literalist Salafis are closer to theological puritans; reformist Salafis are closer to progressive ijtihadists; and political literalist Salafis are closer to political Islamists. See, Abdullah Saeed, Islamic Thought, An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 142-151. Compare this with the Oxford Research Encyclopedias' typology of Salafis, which includes Quietist Salafis, Political Salafis, and Jihadi Salafis.

[22] Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement", in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 19 Aug 2006,* p. 208.

islahiyya); and third, jihadist *salafi* (*al-salafyia al-jihadyia*).[23] The tendency of Salafism shows the fact that the concept and movement of Salafi in history are not monolithic.

Historically, the roots of Salafi are generally attached to the *ahlul hadith*, followers of Ahmad bin Hanbal (780-855). According to the view of the *ahlul hadith*, a better, purer and more authentic source of religious authority is found in the tradition originating from the Prophet Muhammad SAW. It is not based on the opinions of scholars (*ahlu al-Ra'yi*). This view is a comparative (alternative) narrative when faced with the Mu'tazili rationalism movement which tends to base its theological and legal arguments on reason. This classical Salafi view then received an intellectual touch and sharpening from Ibn Taimiyah and his student Muhammad bin Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292-1350). During the Middle Ages and until now, both have been the main sources of inspiration for the Salafi movement. Both encourage independent interpretation and reject blind imitation (blind *taklid*). This Salafi movement culminated in Wahhabi with its main exponent Muhammad bin Abdil Wahhab. Since Wahhabi, Salafi teachings have continued to develop widely and be exported to various countries.

As mentioned above, Salafi is not monolithic. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, a Salafi movement emerged that was different from the Ahlul Hadith Salafi and the Wahhabi Salafi. This Salafi movement is known as "modernist Salafi". This modernist Salafi trend is generally associated with the Iranian activist-thinker Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1838-1897) and the Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh. If the previous Salafis tended to focus back on *the salafu al-shâlih* to purify Islam from deviant teachings, then this modernist Salafi emphasizes more on *the salâfu al-shâlih* to remove elements of religion that are considered backward for the sake of "modernizing" Islam. [24] This Salafi trend has also spread widely in various countries, including Indonesia.

In its development, the term *salafiyah* became a fairly complex term, involving ideology, religious and political discourse because it was not constructed by a particular discourse, group or authority. Later, Madawi al-Rasheed called this *salafiyah* an elastic identity that is open to a number of meanings. According to him, in the West today, *salafiyah* is seen as a representation of radical extremism, intolerance, backwardness and violence. Some Western media and even in scholarly

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[23] Omayma Abdel-Latif, "Trend in Salafism" dalam Michael Emerson, Kristina Kausch And Richard Youngs (Ed.), *Islamist Radicalisation, The Challenge for Euro-Miditerranean Relations* (Brussels: Centre For European Policy Studies, 2009), p. 69.

[24] Read, Oxford Riset Ensiklopedias, "Religion" in https://oxfordre.com/religion/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-255;jsessionid=EE64607912496E4E969AE64DDC024169. Accessed on 20/02/2023.

works, these *salafiyah* are often described as "fundamentalists" and potential terrorists. On the other hand, outside the West, salafiyah is seen more as a representation of authentic Islam. [25]

The Origins and Development of Salafi-Wahhabi

The origins of Salafi-Wahhabi (*Wahhâbiyah*) can be traced back to the 18th century religious movement in the Arabian Peninsula. This term is generally attached to the religious community or movement pioneered by a scholar of Najd, Saudi Arabia, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab—although the community or religious movement preferred to call itself *al-Muwahhidûn* or *ahl al-tawhîd* (monotheists). Some of them even preferred to call themselves Salafiyah. [26]

Historically, Madawi al-Rasheed and also Sa'id Ramadhan al-Buthi said that the term salafi is actually a modern term that only emerged in the late 19th century, especially associated with the Islamic renewal movement of Muhammad Abduh and Jamaluddin al-Afghani in Egypt.[27] The problem is how the Wahhabis who emerged in the 18th century, then called themselves salafiyah, a term that itself emerged in the late 19th century. According to al-Buthi, salafiyah is a symbolic appeal of the Islamic renewal movement. According to him, a renewal movement always requires certain symbols that can be an attraction and attention of the people. In this context, salafiyah is raised as the symbolic attraction. For them, salafiyah is a symbol of the movement to purify religion and return Muslims to the correct understanding of Islam, following in the footsteps of the *salaf al-shâlih*. Thus, leaving all forms of *bid'ah*, suspicion and various forms of deviation. [28]

Furthermore, al-Buthi explained that in order to attract the attention and passion of the people towards Islam, these reformers used the Salafiyah symbol. This symbol has two meanings, namely, first, following the pious predecessors (salaf); and second, returning Islam as a religion of action, work and jihad, not a sleeping religion and far from the reality of life. Al-Buthi argued that this Salafiyah symbol was chosen, in addition to being able to reawaken the passion of the people towards Islam, it can also dampen the feeling of the inferior image of Islam by connecting it to the salaf era as the orientation of all happiness, progress and goodness. [29] In the context of this Islamic renewal movement, especially that pioneered by Abduh, the symbolic power of the Salafiyah was quite successful in fostering a tendency towards Islamic modernism. The form of Islam was

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[25]Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Views from a New Generation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 3.

[26]Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State,* p. 2; Hamid Algar, *Wahhabisme,* p. 19.

[27]Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State,* p. 3; Muhammad Sa'id Ramadhan al-Buthi, *al-Salafiyah, Marhalaṯ Zamâniyaṯ Mubârakaṯ, lâ Madzhab Islâmiy,* (Damaskus-Suriyah: Dar al-Fikr, 1988), pp. 231-232.

[28]Al-Buthi, *al-Salafiyah,* p. 233.

[29]Al-Buthi, *Salafiyaṯ,* pp. 233-234.

adaptive to modern cultural values, thus allowing for various integrations of Western and Muslim thoughts.

The Wahhabis used the symbolic attraction of Salafiyah to brand their theological ideas as Salafiyah. According to al-Buthi, they changed the term Wahhabiyah to Salafiyah because they were tired of the stigma associated with adherents of Muhammad Abdul Wahhab's school of thought, with all of its distinct privileges and characteristics. This was to ensure that Wahhabiyah was acknowledged as a representative of Salafiyah in its beliefs, teachings, and views, rather than simply the teachings of its founder, Muhammad bin Abdil Wahhab.[30] Since then, the Wahhabis have been particularly active in claiming and spreading the Salafiyah philosophy.

At the same time, there has been a shift in the meaning of Salafiyah from previously being a symbolic force of a renewal movement to a label for a particular group or school of thought. Unfortunately, the symbolic meaning of Salafiyah has also shifted from previously providing a middle ground for the growth of adaptive Islamic modernism tendencies in building harmony between Islam and modern cultural values, to an ideological formulation that is anti-adaptationist modernization. Moreover, they claim to be the only ones who faithfully follow the Salafist principles, while viewing other Muslim groups as wrong and full of deviations.[31]

Regarding to the development of Salafi Wahhabi, scholars are divided into two poles. The first pole is those who appreciate Salafi Wahhabi as a religious movement that has laid the foundations of reformism in Islam. This pole is represented by Fazlur Rahman[32] and Natana J.[33] DeLong-Bas, among others. Another pole is scholars who describe the negative image of Salafi Wahhabi as a religious movement that has left many traces of intolerance, hatred and extraordinary fanaticism, which culminated in various acts of violence, massacres and cruel acts. Finally, Wahhabism is considered a religious ideology that inspires the emergence of extremism, religious radicalism and global terrorism. This pole is represented by Khaled M. Abou El Fadl,[34] Hamid Algar,[35] Stephen Sulayman Schwartz,[36] Ahmad Rashid[37] and Said Agil Siradj.[38]

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[30]Al-Buthi, *Salafiyat,* pp. 235-236.

[31]Al-Buthi, *Salafiyat,* p. 236. See also, John Obert Voll, *Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (The United States of America: Vestview Press, 1982), pp. 162-163.

[32]Rahman, *Islam,* pp. 289-290.

[33]DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam,* pp. 8, 13, 17.

[34]El Fadl, *The Great Theft,* pp. 46-56.

[35]Algar, *Wahhabisme,* pp. 31-33.

[36]Stephen Schwartz, Stephen Schwartz, *Dua Wajah Islam, Moderatisme vs Fundamentalisme dalam Wacana Global,* terj. Hodri Ariev (Jakarta: Blantika, Libforall, The Wahid Institute dan Center for Islamic Pluralism, 2007), p. 302.

[37]Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia,* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).

[38]Said Agil Siradj, "Radikalisme, Hukum dan Dakwah", in *Harian Umum Republika*, 3 October, 2011.

Regardless of the above debate, quite interesting developments have occurred in the 21st century Salafi Wahhabi. According to Madawi al-Rasheed, the Salafi Wahhabi that developed in Saudi Arabia is not monolithic. So far, many observers have imagined the Salafi Wahhabi as a single religious discourse that dominates Saudi Arabia. In fact, according to Madawi al-Rasheed, Saudi Arabia today, as in other places in the world, does not have a monopoly on religious knowledge, due to new communication technologies, literacy and printing. In Madawi al-Rasheed's findings, there are at least four Wahhabi groups that have developed in Saudi Arabia, first, the established Wahhabi group, represented by the mufti and religious bureaucrats who still dominate Saudi Arabia; second, the *Sahwi* group;[39] third, the Salafi-Jihadi group; and fourth, the Salafi-Islahiyah group.[40]

Another interesting development of Wahhabism in the 21st century is its very rapid spread throughout the world. Wahhabism, borrowing John L. Esposito's expression, was exported to various countries, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Republics in Central Asia, China, Africa, Southeast Asia, to America and Europe, through various offers of aid, building mosques and other institutions, funding and distributing religious books, and giving commissions to imams and scholars.[41] According to Madawi al-Rasheed, the Wahhabi alliance with the absolute monarchy under the leadership of the Al-Saud family dynasty, allowed the movement greater visibility, and at the same time conferred legitimacy on the political leadership. This was especially after Saudi Arabia discovered its abundant oil reserves. Wahhabism then developed into a transnational movement under the protection of the Saudi regime.[42] This transnational Wahhabi movement is what in recent decades has given rise to debate, tension, and even a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, especially after September 11, 2001.

In Indonesia itself, the influence of Wahhabism developed in several phases. The first emergence of Wahhabism in 1804 coincided with the attack on the teachers of the Qur'an (pilgrims)

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[39]The three main doctrines of the Wahhabi established group are *hijrah* (migration to pious areas), *takfir* (denunciation of disbelief) and *jihad* (struggle in the path of Allah). Hijrah is a boundary-drawing mechanism that requires an individual to migrate to pious states. Takfir is the labeling of infidels for groups that practice shirk, heresy, etc. While jihad In the Wahhabi interpretation, jihad is defined and carried out in several ways. Violence is only one of them. Armed jihad under the banner of the ruler is an aspect of his obedience. While some Wahhabi scholars believe in peaceful da'wah, they actually prioritize jihad war against various forms of so-called infidels, including some Muslim groups, nations and sects. According to Madawi al-Rasheed, in the 20th century the official Wahhabi scholars used the three religious concepts (*hijrah, takfir* and *jihad*) as mechanisms to consolidate the political realm. All three are considered conducive to subjugating the population and ensuring total control over public space. See, Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 34.

[40]See, Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State,* p. 22 etc.

[41]John L. Esposito, *Unholy War, Teror in The Name of Islam,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 49.

[42] Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, p. 6. Three facts that drove the development of this Salafi Wahhabi trend were first, the rise of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia; second, the anti-monarchy rhetoric of Egyptian socialists in the 1950s and 1960s and the Iranian revolution after 1979; and third, the defeat of several Arab countries in the war against Israel in 1967. These three facts became fertile ground for Wahhabism as an alternative discourse.

who returned from Mecca and initiated a religious and social reform movement. The second phase when Wahhabism became a hot topic of debate after the second Wahhabi conquest of Mecca in 1924. This phase coincided with the birth of Nahdlatul Ulama (1926), a traditionalist organization whose main goal was to defend traditional beliefs and practices (such as *wasilah*, pilgrimage, *tariqah*, *taqlid*, *fiqh*) from attacks by the "Wahhabis". The third phase in the mid-20th century, there was a heated debate about traditional practices, where their opponents were always dubbed Wahhabi by traditionalists. The fourth phase coincided with the birth of the Indonesian reformist segment driven by political developments, especially *Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DII)* (the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council), which had been closely cooperating with Saudi since the late 1960s. This closeness to Saudi gave rise to strong suspicions of the import of Wahhabism into Indonesia through the provision of assistance for a number of educational activities. The fifth phase, in the 1980s and 1990s, saw the emergence of anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, anti-Shia, anti-Ahmadi and anti-Liberal currents that continued. Many of them came from Saudi and Kuwait. At the end of Suharto's rule, this variant of Islam gained a wide place because it was considered harmless to the regime. Some Muslim groups directly influenced by contemporary Wahhabism occupy a number of positions that distinguish them from non-Wahhabi Salafi groups.[43] The last phase in the 2000s, the re-emergence of Wahhabism was widely associated with the issue of radicalism, extremism and global terrorism, especially after the attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon, United States, on September 11, 2001.

The development of Wahhabism above, clearly illustrates how the social and political constellations that accompany its emergence. The authors argue that no matter how negative and even pejorative Wahhabism is portrayed, Wahhabism will remain a representation of one of the colors of Islam that will always exist, for example, a representation of fundamentalist Islam or Islamism. Because, the fundamental sources of religion (the Qur'an, hadith and Islamic traditions) provide spaces for interpretation for it. On the other hand, the future of Wahhabism will always be changing; it will not remain in a single extreme world. As a result, Wahhabi progress has been uneven up to this point. In other words, Wahhabi and Wahhabism will continue to be manifestations of Islam found in all civilizations.

The Comparative Analysis

Reading the data of Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi, the authors found that in certain aspects, especially in the core teachings to return to pure Islam, there are points of contact or similarities

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[43]Martin van Bruinessen, "Wahhabism Inpluences in Indonesia, Real and Imagined".

between Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi. Both Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi claim to be followers of the salaf generation, particularly the era of the Prophet to the first three generations after. In this aspect, both Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi can be called Salafiyah. This means that both are Salafi with the doctrine of returning to pure Islam, the era of *salâfu al-shâlih*. Sociologically, both Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi are present in a socio-cultural historical context characterized by the spread of religious practices that are considered to deviate from the teachings of pure monotheism. Wahhabi developed in 'Uyainah, Najd, while Muhammadiyah grew in the Kauman area, Yogyakarta. At the time of their presence, these two cities were very thick with syncretic traditions such as polytheism, *bid'ah*, and blind *taklid*.[44] This syncretic socio-cultural background influenced the worldview and perspective of the two reformist Islamic movements. Both of them emphasized the monotheistic worldview, returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah, and rejecting *taklid*. The assumption built by these two Islamic reformist movements was that the decline of Islam after the early generation was more due to the many practices of polytheism, heresy and various other practices that deviated from the teachings of pure monotheism. Therefore, the revival of Islam requires a return to the teachings of pure monotheism. From the sociological and theological rationale aspects, Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi also have points of contact and similarities.

Armed with adequate scientific background on the intellectual treasures of Islam, both developed creativity in religious thought through the doctrine of ijtihad. The result was a claim that they had found an authentic understanding of Islam, pure Islam or the real Islam. This claim to authentic Islam, pure Islam or the real Islam establishes a religious character that is referred to some authors as a truth claim or superiority of faith.[45] This religious character brings further consequences, that is the obligation to straighten out other beliefs that are considered impure or inauthentic. Straightening out this belief is seen as an obligation of da'wah *amar ma'ruf nahy munkar*. In this perspective, both have points of contact and similarities.

However, although in terms of the idea of returning to pure Islam, the sociological background and theological reasoning above have points of similarity, it does not mean that Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi are completely the same. Muhammadiyah, for example, has gone further than Wahhabism by formulating its pure Islamic ideas more contextually in line with

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[44]See, Shaykh Uthman ibn Abdullah ibn Bisyr, Unwân al-Majid fi Târîkh Najd, (Riyad: Darat al-Malik Abdul Aziz, 1982), Vol. I, pp. 33-34; Ahmad Adaby Darban, History of Kauman, (Yogyakarta: Tarawang, 2000), pp. 3, 23.

[45]Amin Abdullah, *Studi Islam, Normativitas atau Historisitas,* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1996), p. 49.

Indonesian culture. In general, a comparative analysis based on the perspective of the selective themes above shows quite a contrasting difference between Salafi-Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah.[46]

First, the aspect of worldview (*akidah*/belief). In the aspect of worldview, there is a point of contact between the two, namely both are based on the worldview of monotheism. This worldview of monotheism creates the consequences of the same movement pattern, that is enthusiasm for the movement to purify the faith and reject all forms of religious practices of *syirik, takhayul, bid'ah* and *khurafat*. In this aspect of worldview, both Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah adhere to puritan theological reasoning. However, this point of contact is not entirely correct if used as a basis for assessment and measurement to equate Muhammadiyah as a whole with Wahhabi. This is because the placement of the idea of monotheism as a conceptual scheme or religious worldview is not only a fundamental belief of Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah but is universal. All religious communities in Islam (whether they are gathered in the kalam course, such as Asy'ariyah, Muktazilah, Maturidiyah, etc.; legal schools, such as Maliki, Hanafi, Syafi'i, Hanbali, or in other religious organizations, such as NU, Persis, Syarikat Islam, etc.) recognize monotheism as the foundation of all their faith, piety, religiosity and social practices. In this case, there is no plurality of Islam.

The difference lies in the level of interpretation, conceptualization and contextualization. Muhammadiyah, for example, has gone further in formulating the conceptual scheme of monotheism above, as can be read in the formulation of social monotheism and theology (fikih) of its amal Al-Maun. If Wahhabi, like other classical kalam courses, places the idea of monotheism (monotheism) in the perspective of "purification of divinity",[47] then Muhammadiyah with the idea of social monotheism and theology of its amal Al-Maun, develops farther towards "liberation of humanity" and ecology. [48] Wahhabi believes that the doctrinal implication of the idea of monotheism is the orientation of devotion and servitude only to Allah. Therefore, all forms of devotion and servitude to other than Allah (shirk) are invalid. Muhammadiyah agrees with the idea of monotheism. However, Muhammadiyah does not stop at the doctrinal implications that are divine in nature. Muhammadiyah views that the idea of monotheism must have doctrinal implications for the liberation of humanity, especially the commitment to side with the weak

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[46]Read more, Hendar Riyadi, Understanding Dialogical Islamic Reasoning Through Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah Islamic Narratives (Bandung: Lekkas, 2019).

[47]His three most fundamental divine doctrines are the division of the concept of monotheism into monotheism rububiyah, monotheism uluhiyyah and monotheism asma wa shifat. These three concepts or doctrines of monotheism are related to divine purification.

[48]Iman Permadi (dkk.), "Al-Maun and Climate Crisis: Dynamic between Muhammadiyah and IndigenousCommunities in 21th Century", in *Jurnal Ilmu Dakwah,* 42 (1). 95-110. https://doi.org/10.2158/jid.42.1.11216; Andri Gunawan, "Teologi Surat Al-Maun dan Praksis Sosial dan Kehidupan Warga Muhammadiyah", dalam *Jurnal Salam,* Vol. 5 No.2 (2018), pp.161-178, DOI: 10.15408/sjsbs.v5i2.9414.

(*dhu'afâ', fuqarâ', masaîn,* and *mustadh'afîn*), and defending them from all forms of social, economic and political oppression. With a slight modification of Kuntowijoyo's theocentric and humanism-theocentric concepts, [49] the Wahhabi worldview of monotheism—as believed by other Islamic theological schools—tends to be theocentric, specifically centered on divinity. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah's worldview of monotheism is more theo-humanistic or humanism-theocentric, especially centered on God, but its purpose is for the benefit of humanity. From a theological perspective, the Wahhabi theological view (*tawhid*) is closer to traditional theology, while Muhammadiyah theology can be equated with liberation theology. [50]

Second, in terms of ethos (ethics), both Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah base their ethics on their monotheistic worldview. Both emphasize a critical attitude towards popular religious practices, especially *taqlid, shirk, superstition, bid'ah* and *khurafat.* This ethos can simply be called the ethos of pure Islam or true Islam. Although there is a same line between the two in terms of the ethos of pure Islam, the two have quite contrasting differences in other social ethos. For example, in the ethics of social relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. For Wahhabi, relations between Muslims and non-Muslims are very limited, even forbidden. This is related to the concept or ideological instrument of Wahhabi, namely *al-wala wa al-barra'* (loyalty and denial). One of the teachings of *al-barra* is manifested in a strict commitment in Islam in the social and personal fields (such as the use of Muslim names and the prohibition of *muludan*), as well as its political interpretation of the concept which limits relations with non-Muslims (both accepting and giving assistance to non-Muslims).

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah is quite open and encouraged to remain kind, tolerant and respectful of non-Muslims. Likewise in terms of developing arts and culture. Wahhabi does not allow the creation of sculptures or living works of art, while Muhammadiyah appreciates the development of any art and culture as long as it meets several criteria: not causing *fasad* (damage), *dharar* (danger), *'ishyan* (disobedience), and *bâ'id an Allâh* (far from Allah).

Another ethos that shows the difference between Wahhabism and Muhammadiyah is the absence of the use of religious concepts that are Wahhabi religious doctrines, such as *hijrah* (migration to pious areas), *takfir* (infidels), and *jihad* (struggle in the way of Allah). In the Guidelines of Islamic Life of Muhammadiyah Society, these religious concepts are not used at all, except for the term *jihad* which is mentioned no more than five times, and even then in a different sense from

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[49] Kutowijoyo, *Paradigma Islam, Interpretasi untuk Aksi* (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), p. 229.
[50] Compare to Gustavo Gutierrez's liberation theology in A. Suryawasita, Gustavo Gutierrez's Liberation Theology, (Yogyakarta: Jendela Grafika, 2001), pp. xv-xviii.

what is understood by Wahhabis. Muhammadiyah understands it as sincerity, and sacrifice in the form of property and self, while Salafi Wahhabis, especially Salafi jihadists understand it as a physical struggle with violence and weapons.

Third, in terms of religious views, the differences between Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah are even clearer. In this religious view, there is a point of contact between Salafi-Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah in that both view Islam as a perfect and complete religion. However, they differ in confronting the perfect and complete Islam with the issue of modernity or progress. Salafi-Wahhabi tends to prefer the development of fundamental Islamic norms, while Muhammadiyah provides a rather open interpretation of Islam, so that it has relevance to the development of modernity.

If we read some official texts of Muhammadiyah, especially the formulation of the Progressive Islam Message, the Decision of the 46th Muhammadiyah Congress on the Statement of Muhammadiyah Thoughts in the Second Century (*Zhawâhir al-Afkâr al-Muhammadiyyah li al-Qarni al-Tsâni*) and the Decision of the 46th Muhammadiyah Congress on Muhammadiyah and Strategic Issues of the Community, Nation and Universal Humanity, then it can be concluded that Muhammadiyah is different from Wahhabi. The authors, for example, found at least 10 (ten) main ideas contained in the Statement of Muhammadiyah Thoughts in the Second Century. The ten main ideas are first, the creed of Islam as a perfect religion; second, progressive Islam; third, the path of enlightenment; fourth, ijtihad as an instrument of progressive Islam; fifth, charity as the embodiment of the concept of balance and down-to-earth Islam; sixth, the conception of an Islamic society that has the character of *khaira ummah* (the best people), has the position and role of *ummatan wasatha* (middle people), and *syuhada 'ala al-nas* (historical actors); seventh, the integration of Islam and Indonesian values; eighth, cosmopolitan Islam; ninth, jihad as a form of endeavor to mobilize all abilities (*badlul-juhdi*) to realize the life of all humanity that is advanced, just, prosperous, dignified, and sovereign; and tenth, Islam *rahmatan li al-'alamîn* as the goal of all enlightenment movements.

The main ideas above describe the Islamic views of Muhammadiyah quite clearly. The Islamic views of Muhammadiyah are indeed based on a way of thinking about Islam that is complete and perfect, even final and independent. Muhammadiyah also recognizes the idealism of the Islamic generation, especially in the era of the prophethood and Khulafa al-Rasyidin. This fact shows that Muhammadiyah is still oriented towards Salafiyah. However, even though it is oriented towards Salafiyah, in its expression it is different from other Salafiyah movements, including Wahhabi Salafiyah. In the framework of Tariq Ramadan's typology of Islamic thought, Muhammadiyah

Salafiyah can be said to be "reformist Salafiyah" while Wahhabi Salafiyah can be categorized as literalist Salafiyah or political literalist Salafiyah.

Another fact as can be read in the main ideas of the Second Century Statement above is that although based on a way of thinking about Islam that is complete and perfect, even final and independent, Muhammadiyah does not reject plurality, is not looking to the sky, is not oriented towards the past, let alone merely oriented towards "defending God". The main ideas above show that Muhammadiyah's Islamic perspective is not at all aimed at elevating "God's dignity" (defending God). On the contrary, Muhammadiyah has repeatedly stated that the Islam it carries is a progressive Islam, that is Islam which upholds the nobility of human dignity by affirming that it is anti-discrimination, violence, oppression, backwardness, and anti-all forms of destruction on earth, as well as an Islam that protects diversity. This progressive Islamic statement, once again, shows the Islamic character of Muhammadiyah which is open to plurality or diversity, down to earth, and directly touches on concrete universal humanitarian problems. The practice of progressive Islam through the path of enlightenment, the practice of charity, the idea of integration of Islam-Indonesianness, as well as cosmopolitan Islam and Islam *rahmatan li al-'alamîn*, emphasizes the character of Muhammadiyah Islam.

If there is criticism that Muhammadiyah is intolerant and acts radically against popular religious practices and local cultures that it claims are *syirik, bid'ah, takhayul* and *khurafat*, then it must be understood as a choice of its cultural strategy that prioritizes modernization and dynamism. For Muhammadiyah, Islam is a religion of progress, a religion of change and a religion of civilization. The greatest challenge for Muslims is the complexity of progress in many aspects of life that have been built by other communities. Therefore, for Muhammadiyah, any preservation of traditions that shackle people in a state of poverty, ignorance and backwardness must be avoided. It is a disproportionate choice to take an absolute stance of accepting traditions without selection. All traditions are justified and kept without changes in a more constructive, productive, and advanced direction, not because of tolerant attitudes of variety and love for culture. [51]

Fourth, the very contrasting differences between Salafi-Wahhabi and Muhammadiyah can be seen in the aspect of the epistemology of religious thought (manhaj). Based on the reading of the *Manhaj Tarjih and the Development of Muhammadiyah Islamic Thought*, it is clear that Muhammadiyah has been earlier developed thoughts of the importance position of reason in religious understanding. In the concept of ijtihad above, it is explained that facing Islam with the reality of the times requires

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[51]See, Suara Muhammadiyah, edition No. 23/Th. Ke-96, 1-15 December 2011, p. 5.

the development of ijtihad with the use of reason and science as instruments of progress. For Muhammadiyah, the use of reason with science as an instrument of progress is very important in understanding socio-cultural reality. Through an understanding of this socio-cultural reality, Islam will truly become a religion for a contextual life. In the view of Muhammadiyah, ijtihad based on the context must remain based on the authentic source of teachings (text). This means that the literal understanding of the text and context both have an important position in Muhammadiyah religious thought. This tendency is increasingly clear with the formulation of *the Manhaj Tarjih and Development of Muhammadiyah Islamic Thought* which accepts three forms of approach in ijtihad, namely *bayani*, *ta'lili*, and *istislâhi*, as well as three forms of ijtihad approach in the development of thought, namely *bayani*, *burhâni* and *irfâni*. The last three approaches which combine text (*bayâni*), context (*burhâni*) and kasyaf (*irfâni*) have become a guide in the way of thinking for Muhammadiyah members as a reflection of the development of Islamic ways of thinking. [52] The measure of truth is the conformity between text, context and reality. Meanwhile, the characteristics of religious thought show a more tolerant and open character, and accept the relativity of religious thought products.

In terms of the epistemology of religious thought above, Muhammadiyah is clearly different from Salafi-Wahhabi who tend to emphasize more on textual epistemology (literal-textual manhaj). The source of their thought is text; their method is literal-textual; their approach is language and history, and their measure of truth is conformity to the text. Meanwhile, the characteristics of their religious thought tend to be closed, claiming a single truth (not accepting plurality of truths) and accepting the finality of the products of religious thought. In the epistemological framework of Adonis, [53] Muhammadiyah is closer to reason or the epistemology of change (*al-mutahawwil*), while Wahhabi is closer to reason or the epistemology of establishment (*al-tsâbit*).

Fifth, the next contrasting difference lies in their responses to contemporary issues, especially the issues of pluralism and gender. Related to the issue of pluralism, as can be read in its monumental work on *the Message of Progressive Islam, Thematic Interpretation of the Qur'an on Social*

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[52]PP Muhammadiyah, *Pedoman Kehidupan Islami Warga Muhammadiyah* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2003), pp. 11, 15-16.

[53]In the discourse of contemporary Islamic religious thought, Adonis, the nickname of Ali Ahmad Said, is one of the contemporary Arab cultural critics who popularized the theory of *al-tsâbit wa al-mutahawwil* through his masterpiece, *al-Tsâbit wa al-Mutahawwil: Bahts fî al-Ibdâ' wa al-Ittibâ'* (The Established-Static and the Changing-Dynamic: A Study of Creativity and Conservativity According to the Arab Nation). In this work, Adonis defines al-tsâbit as a thought based on text. It becomes the basis of establishment and asserts itself as the only correct interpretation of the text. Based on that, it becomes an epistemological authority (*sulthat ma'rifiyat*). Meanwhile, *al-mutahawwil* is defined in two senses. First, as a thought based on text, but by including hermeneutical interpretation (*ta'wîl*) so that the text becomes open (adapts) to reality and change. Second, as a thought that views the absence of any authority at all in the text. He bases the basic principle of his thought on reason, not naql (tradition or narration). See, Adonis, *al-Tsâbit wa al-Mutahawwil: Bahts fî al-Ibdâ' wa al-Ittibâ'*, (London: Dar al-Syaqi, 1994), vol. I, pp. 13-14.

Relations between Religious Communities and the Tanfidz of Its One Century Congress, Muhammadiyah shows its inclusive character. [54] Muhammadiyah views pluralism positively as the sunnah of Allah. An important concept in social relations between religious communities that it has developed is peaceful coexistence and tolerance. This response to the issue of pluralism also distinguishes it from the Wahhabis who tend to be exclusive. The exclusivism of the Wahhabis can be seen from the vocabulary it has developed such as the owner of the truth (*al-haq*), *salaf al-shalih* and *shirat al-mustaqim* (the straight path). All of these are means to remain "pure" in their beliefs and customs. Likewise with the concepts of *al-walla and al-barra'* which limit relations with non-Muslims. In Ninian Smart's analytical framework, [55] Wahhabis tend to develop an absolute exclusive perspective, while Muhammadiyah tends to be more hegemonic inclusive.

In terms of understanding religious texts related to social relations between religious communities, Wahhabis tend to develop more textual epistemology (methodology) or a literal approach to the text. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah develops more contextual approaches. The differences in perspective and approach give rise to differences in how they respond to people of other religions. Salafi-Wahhabis tend to develop an ethic of obligation to hate and be hostile, and forbid friendship, brotherhood, cooperation with and taking leaders from non-Muslims. In contrast, Muhammadiyah develops more ethics of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Moreover, Muhammadiyah also justifies establishing friendship, brotherhood, mutual assistance and cooperation with non-Muslims or people of other religions, as long as they demonstrate a peaceful attitude. This kind of inclusive view is clearly a manifestation of the worldview, ethos, religious views and epistemology of religious thought above.

Meanwhile, on the issue of gender, as can be read in *Adabul Mar'ah fil Islam*, *Fikih Perempuan*, and *Risalah Perempuan Berekemajuan*, Muhammadiyah clearly upholds the idea of gender equality and justice. Muhammadiyah believes that men and women have equality as *'abid* and *khalifah fi al-ardh*, and have the same rights to economic, political, legal and cultural resources. Muhammadiyah also believes that women have the freedom to pursue careers, both in the domestic and public spheres, according to their choice.

The response to this gender issue, other differences between Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi increasingly clear, because the Salafi-Wahhabis place the domestic position of women as something ideal. The views of the Salafi-Wahhabis can be seen—among others—from the fatwas

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[54]Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam PP Muhammadiyah, *Tafsir Tematik Al-Quran tentang Hubungan Sosial Antarumat Beragama* (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2000).

[55]See, William M. Johnston (ed.), *Recent Reference Books in Religion: A Guide for Students, Scholars, Researchers, Buyers, & Readers*, (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1998), p. 116.

of Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, a Salafi-Wahhabi cleric who was quite influential and once served as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.[56]

From the explanation above, it is clear that Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi have certain points of contact related to the Islamic view of the status and dignity of women. However, Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi have contrasting differences in terms of gender issues, especially in terms of women's freedom to pursue a career in the public sphere, leadership, equality in managing resources, both political, economic, legal and cultural.

CONCLUSION

Based on the comparative analysis above, it can be concluded that Muhammadiyah and Salafi-Wahhabi are two different images of Islam. If between the two there is a meeting point and similarities, then it can be ascertained that the similarities are in two things: First, similarities in *Usul al-Aqidah* (the main principles of *aqidah*), where every Muslim must not have different views. An example is regarding believing in the basic principles of the pillars of faith. Therefore, Muhammadiyah has an intersection with Salafi-Wahhabi in the mission of purifying religious beliefs (*aqidah*) from everything that will lead to polytheism. Second, similarities in the matter of *furu' fiqhiyyah* (partial problems of *fiqh*), that too in the corridor of the four *madzhab* of fiqh Ahlusunnah wal Jama'ah (Hanafi, Maliki, Syafi'i and Hambali), where the differences between the four *madzhab* are very often found in the matter of *furu' fiqhiyyah*. As for *furu' al-Aqidah* (secondary beliefs), Muhammadiyah's Aqidah as represented by the Muhammadiyah Tarjih Decision Assembly, tends more towards Asy'ari Aqidah, especially in the method of believing in the attributes of Allah SWT. In addition, the differences between the Muhammadiyah entity and Salafi-Wahhabi are more apparent in the aspects of ethos (ethics), religious views, epistemology of religious thought (*manhaj*) and in its response to issues of pluralism and gender. Even if we still want to force Muhammadiyah into the Salafi category, then the Salafism adopted by Muhammadiyah is Salafi-Ash'ari (Salafism formulated by Imam Abu Hasan Asy'ari) which in Tariq Ramadan's terms is called Salafi-reformist, while Wahhabi is closer to Salafi-literalist or political literalist Salafi. This conclusion simultaneously confirms the thesis of Alwi Shihab, Azyumardi Azra and Haedar Nashir on the distinction between Muhammadiyah and Wahhabi and corrects the thesis of Seyyed Husein Nasr on Muhammadiyah neo-Wahhabism and the thesis of M. Dawam Rahardjo on Muhammadiyah conservatism and fundamentalism.

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[56]A complete explanation of gender problems from Shaikh Abdul-Aziz bin Baz can be seen in Majmû' Fatawâ, juz I, pp. 418-420.

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