

# **State abandonment and the resurgence of Indonesian Islamic State (NII) movements**

Akhmad Rifa'i

*UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia*

*E-mail: akhmad.rifai@uin-suka.ac.id*

Kristian Adi Putra

*Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz University Saudi Arabia*

*E-mail: k.putra@psau.edu.sa*

Ainrisq Auliya Rifai

*Texas A&M University, United State of America*

*Email: ainrisq.rifai@tamu.edu*

Ahmad Izudin

*UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia*

*Email: ahmad.izudin@uin-suka.ac.id*

Evi Septiani

*UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia*

*Email: estha23@gmail.com*

*DOI:10.18326/ijims.v15i1. 143-173*

## Abstract

This article aims to investigate the reasons contributing to the emergence of the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) in Garut Regency, particularly in the context of state regulations that prohibit movements advocating for Islamic revivalism. Employing a case study approach, data were collected through observation, interviews, and documentation over a four-month period (September–December 2022), leading to several significant findings. The initial discovery elucidated a covert recruitment strategy that leveraged a network of pesantrens and religious leaders, employing deceptive identities to evade detection. The second result highlighted the ability of the NII to persist in the face of state prohibitions by capitalizing on regulatory loopholes and the inadequate coordination between central and regional government entities. The third finding investigated the influence of structural poverty and inadequately targeted development initiatives as significant factors driving community engagement in the revivalist movement, leading to the NII's public declaration of its presence. These phenomena underscore the state's ongoing negligence and disregard, ostensibly under the guise of promoting openness and freedom of expression in a democratic context, which seemingly facilitates the existence of Islamic revivalist groups. This situation is further exploited by politicians within a bureaucratic plutocracy, particularly during election campaigns, to garner support from potential voters.

Tulisan ini berusaha menggali alasan di balik kebangkitan Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) di Kabupaten Garut, dan mengapa hal ini muncul di tengah aturan negara yang melarang gerakan *Islamic revivalism*. Dengan pendekatan studi kasus dan pengumpulan data melalui observasi, wawancara, dan dokumentasi selama empat bulan (September–Desember 2022), ditemukan beberapa temuan kunci. Temuan pertama berhasil mengungkap strategi rekrutmen tersembunyi yang memanfaatkan jaringan pesantren dan tokoh agama dan penggunaan identitas kamufase untuk menghindari deteksi. Temuan kedua mengungkap keberhasilan NII eksis di tengah pelarangan negara dengan cara memanfaatkan celah regulasi dan koordinasi yang lemah antara pemerintah pusat dan daerah. Temuan ketiga mengkaji peran kemiskinan struktural dan program pembinaan yang tidak tepat sasaran sebagai faktor pendorong keterlibatan masyarakat dalam gerakan revivalis sehingga NII ini secara terang-terangan mendeklarasi diri di hadapan publik. Fakta-fakta ini menunjukkan kelalaian dan pengabaian negara yang terus berlanjut dengan dalih keterbukaan dan kebebasan berpendapat di era demokrasi, seolah memberikan ruang bagi kelompok revivalis Islam untuk tetap

eksis, dimanfaatkan oleh politikus dalam agenda plutokrasi birokrasi dan momentum kampanye pemilu guna meraih simpati konstituen potensial.

**Keywords:** *The state abandonment; Islamic revivalism movements; NII; Neglected of the official apparatus*

## Introduction

The subject of Islamic revival has emerged within the historical and contemporary context of Muslim societies, influenced by social and political changes that closely affect the movements of Islamic groups aligned with puritan beliefs.<sup>1</sup> The persistence of revivalist groups, particularly in predominantly Muslim countries like Indonesia, which has enacted a ban on such activities, creates a paradox. Although the Indonesian government's amendments to Act Law No. 59 of 1958 to penalize Islamic revivalist movements<sup>2</sup>, the endurance and adaptability of these groups pose intricate social and political challenges.<sup>3</sup> This situation prompts the authors to delve deeper into the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. A case study of the Indonesian Islamic State (*Negara Islam Indonesia* – NII) organization in Garut Regency illustrates the difficulties in curbing revivalist groups, even after their activities have been prohibited.<sup>4</sup> Nearly 170,000 members of the NII

---

<sup>1</sup>Robert W. Hefner, "Islamists, Muslim Democrats and Citizenship in Contemporary Indonesia", in *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, 2nd ed., London: Routledge, 2020, 13; Ayang Utriza Yakin, "Salafi Dakwah and the Dissemination of Islamic Puritanism In Indonesia: A Case Study of the Radio of Rodja", *Ulumuna*, Vol. 22, no. 2 (2018), 205–36, <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v22i2.335>; Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, "Being Pious Among Indonesian Salafists", *AlJami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 55, no. 1 (2017), 1–26, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.551.1-26>.

<sup>2</sup>Endang Turmudi, "Islamic Twists and the Decline of Islamism in Indonesia", *Harmoni*, Vol. 15, no. 3 (2016), 161–72.

<sup>3</sup>Kikue Hamayotsu, "Conservative Turn? Religion, State and Conflict in Indonesia", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 87, no. 4 (2014), 815–25, <https://doi.org/10.5509/2014874815>.

<sup>4</sup>Jan A. Ali, "Modernity, Its Crisis and Islamic Revivalism", *Religions*, Vol. 14, no. 1 (2022), 15, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010015>. economic, and political transformation of human experience, with tradition or religion having no significant role to play. It is the gradual decline of the role of religion in modernity through the implementation of the principles

have emerged despite state-imposed restrictions,<sup>5</sup> leading to the perception that government repression is ineffective in addressing their activities.

The Islamic revivalism movement in Indonesia has garnered considerable interest from international scholars, who typically examine it through political and ideological lenses. Numerous existing studies portray conservative groups as embodiments of Islamic resurgence seeking to gain power, as indicated by terms such as conservative turn, cosmopolitanism, and the rebranding of Islam within Islamic political discourse.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, Islamic revivalists are often viewed as political entities pushing for the implementation of *amr ma'rūf* and *nahy munkar* (a phrase that translates to “created something better and steering clear of all types of wrongdoing or malevolence”) and the reformation of the state according to sharia. Research by scholars—such as Munabari, Larasati, and Ihsan<sup>7</sup>, Minardi<sup>8</sup>, Mukherjee<sup>9</sup>, Zulfadli<sup>10</sup>, and

---

of secularism which has, according to Islamic revivalists, plunged the world into crisis or jahiliyya (unGodliness)

<sup>5</sup>CNN Indonesia, “BNPT: Pengikut NII di Indonesia 170 Ribu Orang”, *CNN Indonesia*, January 26, 2022, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220126152946-12-751544/bnpt-pengikut-nii-di-indonesia-170-ribu-orang>.

<sup>6</sup>Carool Kersten, “Islam, Cultural Hybridity and Cosmopolitanism: New Muslim Intellectuals on Globalization”, *Journal of International and Global Studies*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (2009), <https://doi.org/10.62608/2158-0669.1004>; James B. Hoesterey, *Rebranding Islam: Piety, Prosperity, and a Self-Help Guru*, California: Stanford University Press, 2016.

<sup>7</sup>Fahlesa Munabari et al., “Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: The Caliphate, Sharia, NKRI, Democracy, and the Nation-State”, *Jurnal Politik*, Vol. 5, no. 2 (2020), 281–312, <https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v5i2.263>.and the Nation-State, \\uc0\\u8221{ \\i{Jurnal Politik 5, no. 2 (April 10, 2020

<sup>8</sup>Anton Minardi, “The New Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: Accommodationist and Confrontationist”, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 12, no. 2 (2018), 247–64, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.2.247-264>.

<sup>9</sup>Kunal Mukherjee, “Islamic Revivalism and Politics in Contemporary Pakistan”, *Journal of Developing Societies*, Vol. 26, no. 3 (2010), 329–53, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X1002600303>.

<sup>10</sup>Zulfadli et al., “From Islamic Modernism to Islamic Conservatism: The Case of West Sumatra Provinces, Indonesia”, *Cogent Social Sciences*, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2024), 2406297, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2406297>.

Rahman<sup>11</sup>—investigates this movement as a political initiative aimed at integrating Islam *kāffah* (comprehensively) into national and governmental matters. However, critical analyses suggest that behind this idealistic portrayal lie particular ideological agendas, as evidenced by groups such as *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI), *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), and *Forum Umat Islam* (FUI), which leverage Islamic ideology as a political instrument to challenge the legitimate and constitutional state. These groups often resort to violence, intimidation, coercion, and even terrorism to fulfill their goals. Slogans advocating “*Going Back to the Quran and Sunna*” reflect a purist ideology that influences not only socio-cultural aspects but also carries significant political ramifications.<sup>12</sup>

The Indonesian government has implemented a policy to address Islamic radicalism movements.<sup>13</sup> This regulation often focuses on the formal aspects of these organizations, neglecting the underlying social and economic networks that support them. As a result, Islamic radicalism groups continue to exist at the community level, taking advantage of interconnected strategic balances. Additionally, state pressure has prompted these groups to adapt by shifting their ideologies and using social media to recruit individuals who are socially vulnerable, dissatisfied with the governance system, and affected by economic inequality.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, alternative Islamic economic

---

<sup>11</sup>Bambang Arif Rahman, “Islamic Revival and Cultural Diversity; Pesantren’s Configuration in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia”, *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 12, no. 1 (2022), 201–29, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v12i1.201-229>.

<sup>12</sup>Hijrian Angga Prihantoro, “Hassan Hanafi and Islamic Legal Theory: From Phenomenology to Critique of the Slogan ‘Going Back to the Qur’an and Sunna’”, *Mazahib*, Vol. 20, no. 2 (2022), 193–224, <https://doi.org/10.21093/mj.v20i2.3750>.

<sup>13</sup>Rizky Alif Alvian and Irfan Ardhani, “The Politics of Moderate Islam in Indonesia: Between International Pressure and Domestic Contestations”, *AlJami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 61, no. 1 (2023), 19–57, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2023.611.19-57>.

<sup>14</sup>Arif Zamhari, Muhammad Ibtissam Han, and Zulkifli Zulkifli, “Traditional Religious Authorities in New Media: A Study of The Cariustadz.Id Platform as An Alternative Cyber Fatwa and Da’wah Media among The Middle-Class Urban Muslims”, *Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah*, Vol. 21, no. 1 (2021), 65–88, <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v21i1.20300>.

networks, including sharia cooperatives and philanthropic crowdfunding, have proven to be effective means of recruitment. Once individuals join, they participate in rigorous training that promotes the ideology of jihad, opposition to secularism, and the purification of Islam within a tightly-knit community that is hard for authorities to monitor. Regrettably, the state frequently struggles to disrupt this cycle, as its policies do not address the underlying issues, such as economic disparity and the marginalization of specific groups, which allows radical organizations to persist and evolve within community-based resistance efforts.

Therefore, previous studies have not yet fully explored how state negligence plays a role in the ongoing sustainability of the Islamic revivalism movement. While some organizations have been disbanded, the government often neglects to dismantle the grassroots social, economic, and religious networks that support this movement. The absence of a long-term strategy to tackle structural issues like economic inequality, the marginalization of specific groups, and ineffective deradicalization policies actually allows revivalist groups to thrive. Consequently, there is a lack of academic research focused on the social mechanisms that prevent the sustainability of this movement, particularly regarding how the state, whether directly or indirectly, addresses the endurance of Islamic revivalism in Indonesia.

The main argument of this research is that merely imposing state restrictions is insufficient to curb Islamic revivalist movements. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the connections between these movements and local socio-political frameworks. The study contends that revivalist groups persist not just due to their ideological beliefs, but also because they are woven into economic, social, and religious networks.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>Raimonda Iškauskaitė, "The Complexity of the Concept of Islamic Revivalism and Revivalists' Understanding of a Proper Model of State", *Politologija*, Vol. 66, no. 2 (2012), 105–46, <https://doi.org/10.15388/Polit.2012.2.1518>.

Additionally, it suggests that neglect or inconsistency in government policies can inadvertently aid the growth of these groups. By moving away from a security-focused perspective and adopting a broader socio-political analysis, this research enhances our understanding of the development of Islamic revivalism in today's world.

This paper investigates the sustainability of the Islamic revivalist movement, specifically the NII, within the context of Indonesia's democratic framework, with a particular focus on Garut Regency as a case study. The study is organized around several critical dimensions, including covert recruitment strategies that leverage networks of Islamic boarding schools and religious leaders, the employment of concealed identities to evade detection, and the presence of regulatory deficiencies coupled with inadequate coordination between central and regional governmental authorities. Furthermore, the research delves into the influence of structural poverty and ineffective training programs as contributing factors to community engagement in the revivalist movement. Employing a qualitative methodology, this study seeks to elucidate the intricate dynamics that enable the NII to persist despite governmental prohibitions, as well as the implications of this persistence for socio-political stability and law enforcement initiatives in Indonesia. The findings are anticipated to yield more effective policy recommendations aimed at addressing the challenges presented by the Islamic revivalist movement in the future.

### **Islamic revivalism, state negligence, and political implications**

In this section, the authors aim to redefine the idea and classification of Islamic revivalism. Essentially, Islamic revivalism refers to movements within the Muslim community that promote social, political and economic changes in a democratic country.<sup>16</sup> This movement encompasses not only

---

<sup>16</sup>Ali, "Modernity, Its Crisis and Islamic Revivalism"...

religious elements but is also frequently linked to political objectives, social reforms, and calls for the implementation of an Islamic state within governmental structures.<sup>17</sup> Over time, Islamic revival movements have evolved into three distinct factions,<sup>18</sup> as illustrated in table 1. The first is Islamism, which adopts a moderate approach to advocate for social reform based on Islamic principles. The second is Islamic fundamentalism, which seeks to establish religion as the core of the political system by promoting a rigid interpretation of Islam. The third is Islamic extremism, which endorses the use of violence, intimidation, and terrorism to achieve political aims rooted in Islam. Based on the overview of these categories and concepts, the authors believe that new movements within Indonesia are likely to emerge, potentially leading to new structures in the nation’s political and social landscape.

Tabel 1. The Faction of the Islamic Revivalism Movements and its examples

No.	Categorizations	Explanations	Examples
1	Islamism	The movements in this category typically use Islam as the foundation for their social and political values. They present the narrative of Islamism in different ways, ranging from moderate to more conservative interpretations.	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), dan Wahdah Islamiyah (WI)

<sup>17</sup>M Sauki, “Perkembangan Islam Di Indonesia Era Reformasi”, *TASAMUH: Jurnal Studi Islam*, Vol. 10, no. 2 (S2018), 443–58, <https://doi.org/10.47945/tasamuh.v10i2.82>.

<sup>18</sup>Derya Iner and Mirela Cufurovic, “Moving beyond Binary Discourses: Islamic Universalism from an Islamic Revivalist Movement’s Point of View”, *Religions*, Vol. 13, no. 9 (2022), 821, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13090821>.



No.	Categorizations	Explanations	Examples
2.	Islamic Fundamentalism	Groups within this movement resist modernization, secularism, and government policies that they view as incompatible with Islamic principles.	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Laskar Jihad, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), dan Front Pembela Islam (FPI)
3.	Islamic Extremism	These groups are more vocal in socio-political movements, engaging in various violent acts against the government and carrying out terror attacks on civilians.	Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), dan Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT).

In a broader context, Islamic revivalism movements are frequently linked to political objectives. The term ‘revivalism’ is often used to assert political identity and pressure the government to adopt Islamic law. For instance, Shukri’s research in Malaysia indicates that the rise of Islamic symbols in public institutions is part of a strategy for identity and socio-political reconstruction.<sup>19</sup> This demonstrates an effort to enhance the role of Islam within the governance system while urging the state to fully acknowledge Islamic values. However, the state’s management of the revivalist movement is often viewed as inadequate.<sup>20</sup> The dominance of political elites has resulted in the neglect of marginalized groups and the state’s failure to mediate social conflicts. This inadequacy creates an opportunity for revivalist groups to step in and address the gaps left by the state, particularly in social, political, and economic areas. Consequently, these groups gain

<sup>19</sup>Syaza Shukri, “Digital Authoritarianism: Protecting Islam in Multireligious Malaysia”, *Religions*, Vol. 14, no. 1 (2023), 87, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010087>.

<sup>20</sup>Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 9, no. 2 (2002), 56–81, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00057>.

legitimacy from the community, which bolsters their position in society as the state is perceived to have failed in fulfilling the people's needs.<sup>21</sup> This scenario leads to a complex relationship between the state and the revivalist movement, where the state frequently loses control over the influence of these movements.

The state's failure to fulfill its responsibilities has greatly affected the socio-political landscape.<sup>22</sup> This has led to increased greater autonomy in addressing their basic needs. The government's inability to manage natural resources fairly and effectively has resulted in economic disparities and a decline in public welfare. Furthermore, the lack of state involvement in resolving grassroots social conflicts has created opportunities for revivalist groups, particularly those rooted in Islam, to step in and fill the gap.<sup>23</sup> These groups propose alternative political and social frameworks based on Islamic principles, which resonate with communities that feel overlooked by the government. For instance, the state's neglect in overseeing natural resource management often results in rampant exploitation that negatively impacts local populations.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, the absence of state intervention in social disputes, such as conflicts between groups or religious tensions, allows radical Islamic movements to gain traction by presenting more assertive solutions grounded in sharia.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, revivalist groups not

---

<sup>21</sup>Susana Borrás and Jakob Edler, "The Roles of the State in the Governance of Socio-Technical Systems' Transformation", *Research Policy*, Vol. 49, no. 5 (2020), 103971, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2020.103971>.

<sup>22</sup>Lindsay Mayka, "Society-Driven Participatory Institutions: Lessons from Colombia's Planning Councils", *Latin American Politics and Society*, Vol. 61, no. 2 (2019), 93–114, <https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2018.79>.

<sup>23</sup>Helmut K. Anheier and Stefan Toepler, "Policy Neglect: The True Challenge to the Nonprofit Sector", *Nonprofit Policy Forum*, Vol.10, no. 4 (2019), 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2019-0041>.

<sup>24</sup>Ilyya Muhsin, Nikmah Rochmawati, and Muhammad Chairul Huda, "Revolution of Islamic Proselytizing Organization: From Islamism to Moderate", *QIJIS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)* 7, no. 1 (2019), 45–70, <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v7i1.5076>.

<sup>25</sup>Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff, "Using Theology to Legitimise Jihadist Radicalism,

only attract support from marginalized communities but also establish parallel structures that challenge state authority. This illustrates how state negligence undermines its legitimacy and bolsters the position of revivalist movements as viable alternatives that better address the social, political, and economic needs of society.<sup>26</sup>

Islamic revivalism functions independently of the government and aims to embed its ideology within the governmental framework. Staniland notes that the state often becomes ensnared in ideological practices that affect social and bureaucratic institutions, leading to a situation where Islamic values are incorporated into state policy and administration. This is evident in the ongoing discussions about the notion of an Islamic state, which is gaining traction in predominantly Muslim countries. The idea of an Islamic state transcends mere ideological debate—it serves as a political tactic for acquiring and sustaining power. Revivalist groups leverage Islamic narratives to establish legitimacy and garner widespread support, advocating for laws and policies that align with sharia principles. In some instances, these initiatives have successfully transformed government structures, with Islamic symbols and values becoming prevalent in public institutions. However, this also creates challenges, particularly in balancing religious interests with societal diversity. Consequently, Islamic revivalism emerges as both a social or religious movement and an ideological instrument that shapes the state's operations and its relationship with citizens.

The Islamic state is frequently viewed as a governance model that seeks to incorporate Islamic principles into various areas of public policy, including politics, regulation, and economics. Ardalan<sup>27</sup> suggests that

---

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses”, *International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research*, Vol. 10, no. 2 (2018), 6–7, <https://doi.org/10.2307/26380429>.

<sup>26</sup>Michael Gunder, “Planning as the Ideology of (Neoliberal) Space”, *Planning Theory*, Vol. 9, no. 4 (2010), 298–314, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095210368878>.

<sup>27</sup>Kavous Ardalan, “Ideology: A Multi-Paradigmatic Approach”, *Journal of Interdisciplinary*

the coercive ideology promoted by revivalist groups has the potential to significantly alter governmental systems by prioritizing the enforcement of Islamic law as a foundational element. This shift impacts the political framework and transforms how the state manages the socio-economic aspects of society. A stark illustration of this concept can be observed in the al-Qaeda network in the Middle East, which openly rejects the established government and strives to fully uphold Islam. This group opposes the current state authority, aiming to replace it with a system based on their interpretation of Islamic law. While this approach is often deemed radical and contentious, it demonstrates how the idea of an Islamic state can serve as a powerful political ideological instrument, particularly in contexts where the state is perceived to have failed in fulfilling the religious aspirations of its populace. Therefore, the discussion surrounding the Islamic state extends beyond theoretical discourse, significantly impacting political and social dynamics in various regions of the Muslim world.

In Indonesia, Islamic revivalism poses a significant risk to the democratic framework. The debates about establishing an Islamic state are gaining prominence, fueled by the growing influence of revivalist groups advocating for a sharia-based political system as an alternative to the existing secular democracy.<sup>28</sup> This situation creates a conflict between democratic principles that support pluralism and individual rights and the push for a wider implementation of Islamic law.<sup>29</sup> If left unaddressed, this could

---

*Economics*, Vol. 31, no. 2 (2019), 124–42, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0260107917736408>.

<sup>28</sup>Chris Chaplin, "Salafi Islamic Piety as Civic Activism: Wahdah Islamiyah and Differentiated Citizenship in Indonesia," *Citizenship Studies* 22, no. 2 (February 17, 2018): 208–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1445488>; Damar Miftahuddin and Noor Malihah, "Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games to Enrich Vocabulary to Foreign Language Learners: The Implementation," *Journal of English Teaching and Learning Issues* 5, no. 2 (December 30, 2022): 81–94, <https://doi.org/10.21043/jetli.v5i2.17090>.

<sup>29</sup>David M. Bourchier, "Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 49, no. 5 (2019), 713–33, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620>.

undermine democratic legitimacy and lead to increased social division. To tackle this issue, the government must implement more effective strategies to engage with revivalist movements while maintaining its democratic integrity.<sup>30</sup> One possible solution is to bolster democratic institutions and ensure that public policies are inclusive, while also allowing for religious expression that aligns with the fundamental principles of the state.

### **Hidden recruitment: Initiative, process, and inventing the Illusion of Islamic-state**

Garut Regency is located in West Java Province and has a population of 2,514,515 as of 2023, with nearly 99.77% identifying as Muslim.<sup>31</sup>

As a largely Muslim region, the Ministry of Religion reports that Garut is home to approximately 1,055 Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) distributed across 44 sub-districts.<sup>32</sup> According to Azra,<sup>33</sup> these boarding schools serve as educational institutions that can potentially act as hubs for disseminating religious ideologies that may shape the political perspectives of the community. This is supported by findings indicating that around 17,000 individuals in nearly all of Garut's sub-districts are affiliated with the NII group.<sup>34</sup> This suggests that the NII is leveraging the network of *pesantrens* to recruit new members and propagate its ideology. As a result, these *pesantrens* play a significant role in shaping local communities and serve as a platform for disseminating religious beliefs, including Islamic revivalist movements like the NII.

---

<sup>30</sup>Noor Malihah, "The Applicative Constructions in Javanese Dialect of Kudus," *Parole: Journal of Linguistics and Education* 6, no. 1 (2016): 18–27.

<sup>31</sup>BPS, "Garut Regency in Figures 2022" (BPS-Statistics of Garut Regency, February 22, 2022), 40, <https://garutkab.bps.go.id/id/publication/2022/02/25/4c1fb6faa5ec86356b9eabb5/kabupaten-garut-dalam-angka-2022.html>.

<sup>32</sup>Interview with KSM, 20 September 2022.

<sup>33</sup>Azyumardi Azra, *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*, Bandung: Mizan, 2006, 124.

<sup>34</sup>Interview with KSM and AAB, 17 September 2022.

The NII organization, although prohibited by the Indonesian government, persists in its existence. This Islamic group often experiences fragmentation due to varying strategies and interpretations of their objectives.<sup>35</sup> As a result, the NII has evolved into two factions: *Fillah* and *Fi Sabilillah*. The *Fillah* faction adopts a passive approach, entrusting the establishment of an Islamic state to divine intervention, while the *Fi Sabilillah* faction takes a more active role in recruiting members and promoting NII ideology through Islamic revivalist initiatives. The *Fi Sabilillah* faction is viewed as more threatening due to its attempts to reform Indonesia's socio-religious framework and challenge the official state ideology.

The recruitment process of the NII, which incorporates factors like religiosity, economics, and marriage, highlights the intricacies of this movement, as illustrated in Figure 1. This Islamic revivalist group employs a multifaceted strategy to garner public support, including the provision of economic and social solutions. The observation that NII promotes marriage as part of its ideological framework aligns with Bayat's analysis<sup>36</sup>, which indicates that the movement capitalizes on society's fundamental needs to broaden its reach. Additionally, the NII recruitment strategy leverages religious teachings, such as the rejection of democracy and the imperative to create an Islamic state, to attract public favor. This aligns with the information provided by the local government:

*As an Islamic revivalist group, this faction has been actively recruiting new members. It re-emerged when its third-generation leader, Sensen Komara, declared himself a prophet and the president of Indonesia in June 2019. Sensen played a key role in revitalizing the Islamic Darul movement from the Fi Sabilillah faction, which gained popularity among the public as he urged his followers to*

---

<sup>35</sup>Hendrik Kraetzschmar and Barbara Zollner, "We Are All Wasatiyyun: The Shifting Sands of Center Positioning in Egypt's Early Post-Revolutionary Party Politics", *Middle East Critique*, Vol. 29, no. 2 (2020), 139–58, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2020.1732010>.

<sup>36</sup>Asef Bayat, "Islamism and the Politics of Fun", *Public Culture*, Vol. 19, no. 3 (2007), 433–59, <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-2007-004>.

*re-establish the Islamic State of Indonesia. His claim to prophethood, marked by the declaration “Asyhadu an La Ilaha illa Allah, wa anna Sensen Komara Rasulullah”, stirred significant controversy within the community. The Fi Sabilillah movement has also discreetly garnered support from influential local leaders, who have become new ‘agents’ for the Darul Islam cause.<sup>37</sup>*

Islamic revivalist movements, like the NII, frequently leverage networks of bureaucratic figures and religious leaders to disseminate their beliefs. This trend is commonly linked to radical Islamic groups that utilize local elite connections to enhance their impact.<sup>38</sup> A notable instance occurred in 2021 when thousands of residents in Garut Regency protested for the dismissal of the local Education Office Head, who was not only suspected of being a regular member but also alleged to have been an NII administrator. This incident illustrates how Islamic revivalist movements can affect public policy and disturb social harmony. Furthermore, Barton, Yilmaz, and Morieson<sup>39</sup> cautioned that social polarization might emerge from the manipulation of differing religious perspectives. This is evident in the recruitment of approximately 23 religious leaders (*Ustadz*) who actively joined this organization to promote NII ideology within the broader community. Interestingly, these leaders were formerly part of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, but shifted their views after aligning with the NII. They continue to engage in Sunni religious practices, such as prayer, which align with the beliefs of the majority of Indonesian Muslims, as a means of blending in or adapting to the prevalent religious customs. This is bolstered by several arguments

---

<sup>37</sup>Interview with AS, 21 September 2022.

<sup>38</sup>Vedi R. Hadiz, “Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right-Wing Politics in Indonesia”, *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 48, no. 4 (2018), 566–83, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2018.1433225>.

<sup>39</sup>Greg Barton, Ihsan Yilmaz, and Nicholas Morieson, “Religious and Pro-Violence Populism in Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of a Far-Right Islamist Civilisationist Movement”, *Religions*, Vol. 12, no. 6 (2021), 397, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12060397>.

from religious leaders and local communities below.

*The Islamic revivalist movement is subtly disguising its activities as being representative of NU in order to gain grassroots support, despite having a hidden agenda to recruit ordinary people into NII. We sought information to document our members as the radicalism movement grew, leading many individuals to join this organization.*<sup>40</sup>

*Numerous campus leaders in Garut Regency were implicated in the ideology of NII as they advocated for it within the community. Although this remains an allegation, the signs of their involvement in the organization were clear.*<sup>41</sup>

This research indicates that the NII, although prohibited by governmental authorities, has managed to persist and flourish by employing intricate recruitment tactics and integrating itself into local power dynamics. Garut Regency serves as a case study illustrating how Islamic revivalist movements can leverage specific socio-religious contexts to enhance their influence. In response to these challenges, it is imperative for the government to implement a more comprehensive strategy that encompasses the fortification of democratic institutions and the enhancement of oversight regarding movements that may pose a risk to national stability.<sup>42</sup>

### **Operating agenda: the apparatus as a part of the Islamic revivalism**

The authors identified three primary factors that facilitated the ongoing development of the NII in Garut Regency: political agendas and persuasion, the role of religious intermediaries and the involvement of marginalized groups, and inadequate supervision. The initial finding indicates that the revivalist movement is frequently employed as a political instrument by local politicians to garner support from constituents, particularly

---

<sup>40</sup>Interview with ASA and AAB, 11 October 2022.

<sup>41</sup>Interview with DAR, 14 October 2022.

<sup>42</sup>Jung Hoon Park, "Localised Impacts on Islamist Political Mobilisation in Indonesia: Evidence from Three Sub-Provincial Units", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 54, no. 3 (2023), 450-79, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463423000474>.



by officials seeking advancement. For instance, evidence suggests that one candidate for the position of Garut Regent engaged in a political campaign that involved connecting with communities associated with the NII movement. This observation aligns with Aspinall's assertion<sup>43</sup> that Indonesian politicians often leverage religious issues to cultivate a base of support. Conversely, as noted by Hadiz<sup>44</sup>, the bureaucratic structures in Indonesia are susceptible to co-optation by various interest groups, including radical Islamic movements. This phenomenon is exemplified by regional officials in Garut Regency, who are often co-opted by the revivalist movement through political persuasion, particularly in pursuit of career advancement. Consequently, political persuasion and agendas have become integral components of the operational framework of the NII movement, as articulated by the informants.

*The coaching budget allocated for overseeing the NII represents a substantial grant. This necessitates the development of an additional agenda focused on financial planning that aligns with appropriate programs aimed at supervising the Islamic revivalism movement.*<sup>45</sup>

The second finding indicates that the recruitment of new members into the NII were facilitated by marginalized religious figures, particularly those affiliated with the NU and Muhammadiyah organizations. In this context, religious leaders frequently serve as intermediaries between the community and the organization, particularly in the management of resource distribution aimed at empowering their constituents.<sup>46</sup> This dynamic has

---

<sup>43</sup>Edward Aspinall, "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses", *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2011), 289–319, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007190>.

<sup>44</sup>Vedi R. Hadiz, "Indonesia's Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 53, no. 3 (2017), 261–78, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2017.1410311>.

<sup>45</sup>Interview with DBS, 12 December 2022.

<sup>46</sup>Senyo Dotsey and Emmanuel Kumi, "Does Religious Faith Matter in Development Practice? Perspectives from the Savelugu-Nanton District in Northern Ghana", *Forum for*

led some marginalized religious figures from Indonesia's largest Islamic organizations to gravitate towards revivalist movements. Such a shift suggests that these religious leaders are expressing ambitions that remain unaddressed within the larger organizational frameworks. Raineri<sup>47</sup> argues that marginalization within mainstream Islamic organizations can drive individuals to seek affiliation with radical groups that provide more defined identities and objectives. This observation underscores the influence of NII on numerous NU cadres, who perceive that their interests are more adequately represented within this group.

*As a member of NU tasked with member registration, I have observed that a significant number of NU cadres have been drawn to the NII. This trend illustrates that certain NU members have become involved in an Islamic revival movement that lacks a solid foundation and tends to eschew moderate Islamic principles. This situation highlights deficiencies in the processes of member engagement and development, as well as suboptimal organizational dynamics in addressing the needs of these individuals.*<sup>48</sup>

The last finding suggests that inadequate state oversight of the revivalist movement facilitates the ongoing transformation and development of the NII. Kirdiş<sup>49</sup> depicts that radical Islamic movements possess the capacity to adapt to shifts in socio-political contexts, particularly in instances where the state fails to enforce effective regulations. The evidence indicates that the NII persists in its evolution despite governmental prohibitions, thereby illustrating how the revivalist group capitalizes on vulnerabilities within the

---

*Development Studies*, Vol. 47, no. 2 (2020), 351–81, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2019.1685591>.

<sup>47</sup>Luca Raineri, "Explaining the Rise of Jihadism in Africa: The Crucial Case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 34, no. 8 (2022), 1632–46, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078>.

<sup>48</sup>Interview with AAM and CHD, 11 November 2022.

<sup>49</sup>Esen Kirdiş, "Same Context, Different Political Paths: Two Islamic Movements in Turkey", *International Area Studies Review*, Vol. 19, no. 3 (2016), 249–65, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865916646561>.

legal and political frameworks to maintain its existence. This situation is further complicated by the pragmatic co-optation of state officials through political persuasion, with some officials appearing to compromise the state ideology of Pancasila for personal gain, such as career advancement. For instance, a Regent in Garut has been reported to engage actively with the NII through political agreements, while several department heads advocate for the ideology. This phenomenon arises from the insufficient state control over regional officials who are affiliated with specific groups, particularly those that have been outlawed by the government. Informant has underscored the necessity for more stringent regulations and effective oversight to mitigate the proliferation of radical ideologies and to reinforce allegiance to the state ideology.

*The Garut Regency, in its capacity as a local governance authority, exhibits a limited responsiveness to radicalism movements, primarily reacting only when incidents gain significant public attention or go viral. Furthermore, it has been observed that the Regent maintained a close association with the NII organization prior to his election to regional office. Consequently, it is not surprising that, in 2022, there were public demonstrations, as the community appeared to be largely unaware of various Islamic revivalist activities occurring within the region.<sup>50</sup>*

This study indicates that the persistence of the NII movement in Garut Regency is significantly shaped by political, social, and bureaucratic dynamics. These include the utilization of the movement for political purposes, the influence of religious leaders, the participation of marginalized public figures, and the co-optation of state officials. Such factors have enabled the NII to maintain its presence despite being officially prohibited, evolving over nearly six decades into new variants characterized by different indications, motives, and operational models.

---

<sup>50</sup>Interview with TP and HD, 11 October 2022.

The inadequacy of state control mechanisms over revivalist groups, combined with the belief that their activities can be effectively managed, has inadvertently facilitated their transformation and ongoing existence. In the absence of robust new regulations and legal frameworks, the Islamic revivalist movement is likely to continue its expansion, capitalizing on systemic vulnerabilities and advocating under the guise of democratic principles. Consequently, a comprehensive strategy is essential, which should encompass enhanced oversight, increased transparency in resource allocation, and the establishment of more stringent regulations to curtail the proliferation of radical ideologies and mitigate their activities.

### **Loopholes of regulation: From unclear coaching programs to identity camouflage**

Ineffective regulatory frameworks between central and regional governments frequently result in the emergence of loopholes that are exploited by Islamic revivalist groups, such as the NII. This ineffectiveness significantly impedes law enforcement efforts against radical factions, as state apparatus in Indonesia often exhibit reluctance to take decisive action due to concerns about potential human rights violations.<sup>51</sup> Such governmental negligence inadvertently facilitates the activities of revivalist movements,<sup>52</sup> which often operate under the pretense of democratic principles.<sup>53</sup> Consequently, the NII movement persists in functioning

---

<sup>51</sup>Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections amidst Rising Illiberalism", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 55, no. 3 (2019), 295–317, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2019.1690412>.

<sup>52</sup>Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation", *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 42, no. 3 (2018), 479–97, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2018.1473335>.

<sup>53</sup>Marcus Mietzner, "The Limits of Autocratisation in Indonesia: Power Dispersal and Elite Competition in a Compromised Democracy", *Third World Quarterly*, (2024), 1–17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2024.2317970>.

as a socio-religious organization, presenting various solutions to local communities. Empirical evidence indicates that state authorities face the challenge of demonstrating that the activities of these groups are inconsistent with the ideology of Pancasila, while the revivalists invoke their rights to freedom of assembly and expression as a protective measure. Therefore, in the absence of improvements in regulatory synchronization and enhancements in the capacity of state apparatus, these movements are likely to continue exploiting systemic vulnerabilities to broaden their influence. This phenomenon aligns with the statements made by the informant in below.

*At times, we encounter a significant dilemma. On one hand, it is imperative to combat Islamic extremism and revivalist movements, such as the NII, due to the potential threats they pose to the nation, particularly to the vulnerable younger generation, in fostering nationalism and patriotism. Conversely, we find ourselves constrained by the principles of democracy, which advocate for freedom of expression and action. As practitioners in the field, we often experience uncertainty in our efforts to safeguard against the Islamic revivalist movement, as there exists a lack of synchronization between regulations at the central and regional levels. Furthermore, the process of apprehending members of proscribed organizations necessitates substantiated evidence, which can be challenging to obtain, particularly when it comes to demonstrating their opposition to the State in concrete terms.<sup>54</sup>*

According to statistical data, the population of Garut is classified as experiencing structural poverty, with approximately 259.32 thousand individuals, representing 9.68% of the population.<sup>55</sup> This information aligns with Surtiari et.al's<sup>56</sup> assertion that poverty frequently serves as a

---

<sup>54</sup>Interview with ITB and AS, 28 September 2022.

<sup>55</sup>BPS, "Garut Regency in Figures 2022"...

<sup>56</sup>Gusti Ayu Ketut Surtiari et al., "Indonesia's Social Protection System: The Relevance of Informal Social Protection to Strengthen Adaptation to Climate Change", *Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences*, Vol. 21, no. 1 (2024), 2375995, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1943815X.2024.2375995>.

primary catalyst for individual participation in radical groups, particularly when the state fails to implement targeted initiatives aimed at fulfilling the basic needs of the community. Furthermore, inadequate training programs contribute to the state's inability to effectively address revivalist movements. This inadequacy arises from the state's tendency to exclude community members from actively participating in the initiation of training and poverty alleviation efforts, resulting in programs that do not align with the actual needs of the population.<sup>57</sup> This situation is corroborated by the fact that nearly 73% of members of the NII are classified as impoverished and exhibit limited engagement with government welfare initiatives.<sup>58</sup> It is evident that a portion of these impoverished individuals becomes involved in radical movements. This assertion is further supported by testimony from one of the informants.

*The individual apprehended by the NII is my neighbor, who is currently unemployed. However, the Islamic organization is capable of offering housing to fulfill the needs of his family.*<sup>59</sup>

The NII movement employs a prevention program that fails to address the fundamental issues within the community, instead utilizing a deceptive identity to evade detection and intervention by state authorities. This strategy of camouflage has garnered the support of prominent religious leaders, culminating in a public declaration on February 3, 2022 (See Figure 2). This announcement took the community by surprise, as Dani et.al's<sup>60</sup> analysis suggests that radical movements often masquerade as

---

<sup>57</sup>Gloria A. Koh, Helen Askill-Williams, and Shyam Barr, "Sustaining School Improvement Initiatives: Advice from Educational Leaders", *School Effectiveness and School Improvement*, Vol. 34, no. 3 (2023), 298-330, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09243453.2023.2190130>.

<sup>58</sup>Interview with ASA, 11 Desember 2022.

<sup>59</sup>Interview with ASA and KSM, 13 Desember 2022.

<sup>60</sup>Dani Muhtada et al., "The Protection of Civil Rights for the Shi'ite Refugees of Sampang, East Java: A Systemic Governance Approach to Restore the Refugees' Rights," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 12, no. 2 (December 17, 2022): 231-56, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v12i2.231-256>.

Islamic organizations. The prolonged use of camouflage tactics in their operational agenda has posed significant challenges for the government in terms of law enforcement, a point corroborated by one of the informants.

*Regulations issued by the central government can pose significant challenges for local governments in effectively addressing Islamic revivalism movements. The complexity of these regulations often hinders law enforcement efforts to suppress such movements. Furthermore, these groups may adopt the guise of associations or organizations to evade prosecution as entities opposing the state. Additionally, the legal framework in Indonesia imposes constraints, as it requires that any actions taken against these movements must be demonstrably unconstitutional.<sup>61</sup>*

In conclusion, this research indicates that the persistence of the NII within a democratic nation such as Indonesia is significantly shaped by regulatory deficiencies, systemic poverty, inadequately targeted development initiatives, and the complexities faced by state authorities in enforcing the law. These elements facilitate the ongoing existence and proliferation of NII, despite its prohibition by governmental authorities. To address these issues, a comprehensive strategy is essential, which should encompass the enhancement of regulatory frameworks, the implementation of more effectively targeted development programs, and the tackling of fundamental poverty issues. Furthermore, improved coordination between central and regional government entities is crucial to ensure the effective enforcement of laws against revivalist movements.

## **Conclusion**

The enduring presence of the NII movement within Indonesia's democratic framework underscores the intricate relationship among regulatory deficiencies, structural poverty, and inadequate state oversight. Despite its official prohibition, the NII continues to flourish by capitalizing on

---

<sup>61</sup>Interview with IIS, 25 November 2022.

systemic weaknesses, such as regulatory misalignment between central and local government regulations, which impedes effective law enforcement. The movement's capacity to disguise its operations under the pretext of democratic ideals, including the rights to assembly and expression, further complicates the state's ability to implement decisive measures. Moreover, the absence of targeted training programs and poverty alleviation initiatives has made many vulnerable individuals susceptible to recruitment by the NII, as the organization provides economic and social solutions that the state fails to deliver. Collectively, these factors enable the NII to sustain its influence and broaden its reach, even in the face of government bans.

The involvement of political agendas, religious leaders, and marginalized communities exacerbates the difficulties in curtailing the NII's activities. Local politicians frequently exploit the movement to garner support from constituents, while religious and public figures who perceive themselves as marginalized from mainstream Islamic organizations find a platform within the NII to pursue their aspirations. This dynamic is further reinforced by the co-optation of state officials, who, motivated by career advancement or political persuasion, inadvertently endorse the movement's ideology. The NII's capacity to adapt and evolve its strategies over nearly six decades highlights the necessity for a more comprehensive approach to addressing its underlying causes, including poverty, social marginalization, and the absence of inclusive development programs.

To effectively counter the NII and similar revivalist movements, the Indonesian government must implement a multifaceted strategy that addresses both the symptoms and root causes of the issue. This strategy should encompass the strengthening of regulatory frameworks, enhancing coordination between central and local governments, and executing targeted poverty alleviation programs that promote community engagement. Additionally, bolstering law enforcement capabilities and



ensuring that state officials remain committed to the principles of Pancasila are essential steps in preventing the co-optation of public institutions by radical groups. By addressing these challenges, Indonesia can diminish the influence of the NII and reinforce its democratic values, thereby ensuring long-term social stability and national cohesion.

## **Bibliography**

- Ali, Jan A. "Modernity, Its Crisis and Islamic Revivalism." *Religions* 14, no. 1 (December 22, 2022): 15. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010015>.
- Alkaff, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman. "Using Theology to Legitimise Jihadist Radicalism, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses." *International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research* 10, no. 2 (2018): 6–7. <https://doi.org/10.2307/26380429>.
- Alvian, Rizky Alif, and Irfan Ardhani. "The Politics of Moderate Islam in Indonesia: Between International Pressure and Domestic Contestations." *AlJami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 61, no. 1 (June 30, 2023): 19–57. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2023.611.19-57>.
- Anheier, Helmut K., and Stefan Toepler. "Policy Neglect: The True Challenge to the Nonprofit Sector." *Nonprofit Policy Forum* 10, no. 4 (November 21, 2019): 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2019-0041>.
- Ardalan, Kavous. "Ideology: A Multi-Paradigmatic Approach." *Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics* 31, no. 2 (July 2019): 124–42. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0260107917736408>.
- Aspinall, Edward. "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11, no. 2 (August 2011): 289–319. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007190>.
- Aspinall, Edward, and Marcus Mietzner. "Indonesia's Democratic Paradox: Competitive Elections amidst Rising Illiberalism." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 55, no. 3 (September 2, 2019): 295–317.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2019.1690412>.

Azra, Azyumardi. *Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation*. Bandung: Mizan, 2006.

Barton, Greg, Ihsan Yilmaz, and Nicholas Morieson. "Religious and Pro-Violence Populism in Indonesia: The Rise and Fall of a Far-Right Islamist Civilisationist Movement." *Religions* 12, no. 6 (May 29, 2021): 397. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12060397>.

Bayat, Asef. "Islamism and the Politics of Fun." *Public Culture* 19, no. 3 (September 1, 2007): 433–59. <https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-2007-004>.

Borrás, Susana, and Jakob Edler. "The Roles of the State in the Governance of Socio-Technical Systems' Transformation." *Research Policy* 49, no. 5 (June 2020): 103971. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2020.103971>.

Bourchier, David M. "Two Decades of Ideological Contestation in Indonesia: From Democratic Cosmopolitanism to Religious Nationalism." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 49, no. 5 (April 8, 2019): 713–33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2019.1590620>.

BPS. "Garut Regency in Figures 2022." BPS-Statistics of Garut Regency, February 22, 2022. <https://garutkab.bps.go.id/id/publication/2022/02/25/4c1fb6faa5ec86356b9eabb5/kabupaten-garut-dalam-angka-2022.html>.

Chaplin, Chris. "Salafi Islamic Piety as Civic Activism: Wahdah Islamiyah and Differentiated Citizenship in Indonesia." *Citizenship Studies* 22, no. 2 (February 17, 2018): 208–23. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1445488>.

CNN Indonesia. "BNPT: Pengikut NII Di Indonesia 170 Ribu Orang." *CNN Indonesia*, January 26, 2022. <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20220126152946-12-751544/bnpt-pengikut-nii-di-indonesia-170-ribu-orang>.

- Denoeux, Guilain. "The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam." *Middle East Policy* 9, no. 2 (June 2002): 56–81. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-4967.00057>.
- Dotsey, Senyo, and Emmanuel Kumi. "Does Religious Faith Matter in Development Practice? Perspectives from the Savelugu-Nanton District in Northern Ghana." *Forum for Development Studies* 47, no. 2 (May 3, 2020): 351–81. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2019.1685591>.
- Gunder, Michael. "Planning as the Ideology of (Neoliberal) Space." *Planning Theory* 9, no. 4 (November 2010): 298–314. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095210368878>.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. "Imagine All the People? Mobilising Islamic Populism for Right-Wing Politics in Indonesia." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 48, no. 4 (August 8, 2018): 566–83. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2018.1433225>.
- . "Indonesia's Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?" *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 53, no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 261–78. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2017.1410311>.
- Hamayotsu, Kikue. "Conservative Turn? Religion, State and Conflict in Indonesia." *Pacific Affairs* 87, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 815–25. <https://doi.org/10.5509/2014874815>.
- Hefner, Robert W. "Islamists, Muslim Democrats and Citizenship in Contemporary Indonesia." In *Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, 2nd ed., 13. London: Routledge, 2020.
- Hoesterey, James B. *Rebranding Islam: Piety, Prosperity, and a Self-Help Guru*. California: Stanford University Press, 2016.
- Iner, Derya, and Mirela Cufurovic. "Moving beyond Binary Discourses: Islamic Universalism from an Islamic Revivalist Movement's Point

- of View.” *Religions* 13, no. 9 (September 4, 2022): 821. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13090821>.
- Iškauskaitė, Raimonda. “The Complexity of the Concept of Islamic Revivalism and Revivalists’ Understanding of a Proper Model of State.” *Politologija* 66, no. 2 (January 1, 2012): 105–46. <https://doi.org/10.15388/Polit.2012.2.1518>.
- Kersten, Carool. “Islam, Cultural Hybridity and Cosmopolitanism: New Muslim Intellectuals on Globalization.” *Journal of International and Global Studies* 1, no. 1 (November 1, 2009). <https://doi.org/10.62608/2158-0669.1004>.
- Kirdiş, Esen. “Same Context, Different Political Paths: Two Islamic Movements in Turkey.” *International Area Studies Review* 19, no. 3 (September 2016): 249–65. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865916646561>.
- Koh, Gloria A., Helen Askill-Williams, and Shyam Barr. “Sustaining School Improvement Initiatives: Advice from Educational Leaders.” *School Effectiveness and School Improvement* 34, no. 3 (July 3, 2023): 298–330. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09243453.2023.2190130>.
- Kraetzschmar, Hendrik, and Barbara Zollner. “We Are All Wasatiyyun: The Shifting Sands of Center Positioning in Egypt’s Early Post-Revolutionary Party Politics.” *Middle East Critique* 29, no. 2 (April 2, 2020): 139–58. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2020.1732010>.
- Malihah, Noor. “The Applicative Constructions in Javanese Dialect of Kudus.” *Parole: Journal of Linguistics and Education* 6, no. 1 (2016): 18–27.
- Mayka, Lindsay. “Society-Driven Participatory Institutions: Lessons from Colombia’s Planning Councils.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 61, no. 2 (May 2019): 93–114. <https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2018.79>.
- Mietzner, Marcus. “The Limits of Autocratisation in Indonesia: Power Dispersal and Elite Competition in a Compromised Democracy.”

*Third World Quarterly*, March 4, 2024, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0/01436597.2024.2317970>.

Mietzner, Marcus, and Burhanuddin Muhtadi. "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation." *Asian Studies Review* 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 479–97. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2018.1473335>.

Miftahuddin, Damar, and Noor Malihah. "Massive Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games to Enrich Vocabulary to Foreign Language Learners: The Implementation." *Journal of English Teaching and Learning Issues* 5, no. 2 (December 30, 2022): 81–94. <https://doi.org/10.21043/jetli.v5i2.17090>.

Minardi, Anton. "The New Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: Accommodationist and Confrontationist." *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 12, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 247–64. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.2.247-264>.

Muhsin, Ilyya, Nikmah Rochmawati, and Muhammad Chairul Huda. "Revolution of Islamic Proselytizing Organization: From Islamism to Moderate." *QIJIS (Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies)* 7, no. 1 (June 3, 2019): 45–70. <https://doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v7i1.5076>.

Muhtada, Dani, Suhadi Suhadi, In'am Zaidi, and Rayyan Alkhair. "The Protection of Civil Rights for the Shi'ite Refugees of Sampang, East Java: A Systemic Governance Approach to Restore the Refugees' Rights." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 12, no. 2 (December 17, 2022): 231–56. <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v12i2.231-256>.

Mukherjee, Kunal. "Islamic Revivalism and Politics in Contemporary Pakistan." *Journal of Developing Societies* 26, no. 3 (September 2010): 329–53. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X1002600303>.

- Munabari, Fahlesa, Nadia Utami Larasati, Rizky Ihsan, and Lucky Nurhadiyanto. "Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: The Caliphate, Sharia, NKRI, Democracy, and the Nation-State." *Jurnal Politik* 5, no. 2 (April 10, 2020): 281–312. <https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v5i2.263>.
- Park, Jung Hoon. "Localised Impacts on Islamist Political Mobilisation in Indonesia: Evidence from Three Sub-Provincial Units." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 54, no. 3 (October 2023): 450–79. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463423000474>.
- Prihantoro, Hijrian Angga. "Hassan Hanafi and Islamic Legal Theory: From Phenomenology to Critique of the Slogan 'Going Back to the Qur'an and Sunna.'" *Mazahib* 20, no. 2 (January 6, 2022): 193–224. <https://doi.org/10.21093/mj.v20i2.3750>.
- Rahman, Bambang Arif. "Islamic Revival and Cultural Diversity; Pesantren's Configuration in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia." *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 12, no. 1 (June 4, 2022): 201–29. <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v12i1.201-229>.
- Raineri, Luca. "Explaining the Rise of Jihadism in Africa: The Crucial Case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 34, no. 8 (November 17, 2022): 1632–46. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078>.
- Sauki, M. "Perkembangan Islam Di Indonesia Era Reformasi." *Tasamuh: Jurnal Studi Islam* 10, no. 2 (September 3, 2018): 443–58. <https://doi.org/10.47945/tasamuh.v10i2.82>.
- Shukri, Syaza. "Digital Authoritarianism: Protecting Islam in Multireligious Malaysia." *Religions* 14, no. 1 (January 9, 2023): 87. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010087>.
- Surtiari, Gusti Ayu Ketut, Mia Wannewitz, Puguh Prasetyoputra, Tiodora Hadumaon Siagian, and Matthias Garschagen. "Indonesia's Social Protection System: The Relevance of Informal Social Protection to

- Strengthen Adaptation to Climate Change.” *Journal of Integrative Environmental Sciences* 21, no. 1 (December 31, 2024): 2375995. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1943815X.2024.2375995>.
- Turmudi, Endang. “Islamic Twists and the Decline of Islamism in Indonesia.” *Harmoni* 15, no. 3 (2016): 161–72.
- Wahib, Ahmad Bunyan. “Being Pious Among Indonesian Salafists.” *AlJami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 55, no. 1 (June 26, 2017): 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.551.1-26>.
- Yakin, Ayang Utriza. “Salafi Dakwah and the Dissemination of Islamic Puritanism In Indonesia: A Case Study of the Radio of Rodja.” *Ulumuna* 22, no. 2 (December 18, 2018): 205–36. <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujs.v22i2.335>.
- Zamhari, Arif, Muhammad Ibtissam Han, and Zulkifli Zulkifli. “Traditional Religious Authorities in New Media: A Study of The Cariustadz.Id Platform as An Alternative Cyber Fatwa and Da’wah Media among The Middle-Class Urban Muslims.” *Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 21, no. 1 (June 30, 2021): 65–88. <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v21i1.20300>.
- Zulfadli, Jamhari Makruf, Zulkifli, and Jajang Jahroni. “From Islamic Modernism to Islamic Conservatism: The Case of West Sumatra Provinces, Indonesia.” *Cogent Social Sciences* 10, no. 1 (December 31, 2024): 2406297. <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2406297>.