

# Minority, cultural citizenship, and Indonesian Islam: challenges in a pluralistic society

Zuly Qodir

*Doctoral Program of Islamic Politics – Political Science, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta*

*E-mail: zuliqodir@umy.ac.id*

Robert W Hefner

*Department of Anthropology, Boston University, United States of America*

*E-mail: rhefner@bu.edu*

*DOI:10.18326/ijims.v14i2. 409-439*

## Abstract

Minority citizenship is a very important dimension that gets attention in a pluralistic country like Indonesia. This is because minority citizens often receive discriminatory, intimidating, and violent treatment from members of the majority religious, ethnic and social groups. Cultural citizenship related to religion, ethnicity and social groups is thus a development study of purely political citizenship studies. Three main findings were obtained through the research. First, multicultural citizenship is a very authentic idea that minority groups aspire to; second, the actions that promote and hinder the recognition of multicultural citizenship in social interactions; and third, the concerns that minority groups in Yogyakarta, and even Indonesia in general, have and experience. This article is intended to contribute to the understanding of multicultural citizenship within the social political life of post reform Indonesia

amidst the phenomenon of rampant Islamization. Theoretically speaking, the article aims to contribute to developing a more authentic and strategic citizenship perspective so that the recognition of minority groups in a Muslim-majority country can transpire harmoniously, not confrontationally.

Kewarganegaraan minoritas merupakan dimensi yang sangat penting untuk diperhatikan di negara majemuk seperti Indonesia. Hal ini dikarenakan warga negara minoritas sering menerima perlakuan diskriminatif, intimidatif, dan kekerasan dari anggota kelompok agama, etnis, dan kelompok sosial mayoritas. Oleh karena itu, kewarganegaraan kultural yang berkaitan dengan agama, etnis, dan kelompok sosial merupakan studi pengembangan dari studi kewarganegaraan politik murni. Ada tiga temuan utama yang diperoleh melalui penelitian ini. Pertama, kewarganegaraan multikultural merupakan gagasan yang sangat otentik yang dicita-citakan oleh kelompok minoritas; kedua, tindakan-tindakan yang mendorong dan menghambat pengakuan kewarganegaraan multikultural dalam interaksi sosial; dan ketiga, keprihatinan-keprihatinan yang dimiliki dan dialami oleh kelompok-kelompok minoritas di Yogyakarta, dan bahkan di Indonesia secara umum. Artikel ini dimaksudkan untuk memberikan kontribusi terhadap pemahaman kewarganegaraan multikultural dalam kehidupan sosial politik Indonesia pasca reformasi di tengah fenomena Islamisasi yang merajalela. Secara teoritis, artikel ini ditujukan untuk memberikan kontribusi bagi pengembangan perspektif kewarganegaraan yang lebih otentik dan strategis agar pengakuan terhadap kelompok minoritas di negara mayoritas Muslim dapat berlangsung secara harmonis, bukan konfrontatif.

**Keywords:** *Citizenship; Minority; Islamization; Social Recognition; Authentic*

## Introduction

Religious minority groups like Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia in Indonesia are social groups that have often been treated differently from their fellow citizens. They are often discriminated against in terms of social recognition and freedom of religion-belief.<sup>1</sup> The presence of these religious minority groups seems unwelcome by some citizens who follow

---

<sup>1</sup>Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Lessons from Madura: NU, Conservatism and the 2019 Presidential Election," *Perspective*, Number 72 (2019), 1-9.

*ahlu sunnah*'s mainstream school of Islamic jurisprudence, i.e., the Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools in Indonesia. Concerning their social life, minority groups are treated with violence, persecuted, and cast out.<sup>2</sup>

Minority groups like Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia still frequently must experience and deal with cases of law violation, crime, and acts of violence. The frequency of cases indicates that Indonesia still finds it difficult to put those ideals into practice for a country that is based on a rule of law, that boasts an inclusive national principle, and that adheres to a moderate religious understanding.<sup>3</sup> Many things impede social recognition, appreciation, and respect for differences of other worshipping practices, rituals, and understanding.<sup>4</sup> Various acts of violence and persecution resulted in disharmony and even social conflict. The majority group often persecuted the minority groups because of political interest and religious understanding. In political events, minority groups often become targets of social mobilization so that the public majority opposes and eliminates them.<sup>5</sup> The cases that unfolded in Cikeusik Bogor West Java, Manislor Tasikmalaya, Lombok Mataram, Yogyakarta, and Cigugur West Java, represent issues demanding the attention of the government, scholars, researchers, and human rights defenders.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Norshahril Saat and Ahmad Najib Burhani (eds.), *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2020.

<sup>3</sup>Nicola Colbran, "Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia", *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 14, no. 5 (2010), 678–704.

<sup>4</sup>Syahril Siddik, "The Origin of the Indonesian Blasphemy Law and Its Implication towards Religious Freedom in Indonesia The Origin of the Indonesian Blasphemy Law and Its Implication towards Religious", *Tebuireng: Journal of Islamic Studies and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2022), 17-33. <https://doi.org/10.33752/tjiss.v3i1.3648>

<sup>5</sup>Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Vote Buying in Indonesia The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery*, London: Pilgrave MacMillan, 2019; Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Geertz's Trichotomy of Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi Controversy and Continuity," *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2017), 329–50, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2017.11.2.329-350>.

<sup>6</sup>Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Torn between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: Discussing Erfaan Dahlan's Religious Affiliation and Self-Exile," *Indonesia and the Malay*

If the state does not give these issues due attention to protect them as stipulated by the law and as fellow citizens, the issue of religious minority group will continue to gravely hamper the growth of moderate Islam and the development of civilized democracy.<sup>7</sup> In this regard, Indonesian democracy will experience a fatal decline due to the behaviors that some citizens have toward other citizens who are different from them. So, although there appears to be a sense of tolerance among fellow citizens with diverse backgrounds, in actual practice, it remains awash with uncivilized democracy. It can even be considered a condition heading toward “fatal democracy”.<sup>8</sup> If the Jokowi-Amin administration does not take caution in responding to issues of religious minority groups, due to pressures asserted by religious paramilitary groups, they will fall into a new kind of authoritarianism that perpetuates systematic violence.<sup>9</sup>

Given such circumstances, it can be observed that discussions on the presence of religious minority groups have not been concluded to this day. Tensions and conflicts still frequently occur at the expense of minority groups. They still require legal legitimacy and policy recognition from the government as fellow citizens who have the right to live and worship as citizens of the mainstream group do.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, elaborations pertaining to why minority groups are often discriminated, persecuted, treated violently, and cast out need to be provided. While in fact, they

---

*World*, Vol. 48, no. 140 (2020), 60–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2019.1663678>

<sup>7</sup>Robert W. Hefner, “The Study of Religious Freedom in Indonesia,” *Review of Faith and International Affairs*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2013), 18–27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2013.808038>.

<sup>8</sup>Vedi R Hadiz, “Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?,” *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 53, no. 3 (2017), 261–78.

<sup>9</sup>Marcus Mietzner, “Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism,” *Democratization*, Vol. 27, no. 6 (2020), 1021–36, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1704266>.

<sup>10</sup>Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316344446>.

are an inseparable part of the Republic of Indonesia. They have the same national understanding as the religious mainstream groups and maintain Indonesian aspirations that are in line with Pancasila. The minority groups' national or political ideologies serve as one of the strengths that reinforces Indonesian-ness.<sup>11</sup>

Citizenship is a study that emphasizes the relationship between individuals and the state regarding rights and obligations. More importantly, citizenship is a political recognition of citizens' rights to religion, politics, and life as individual rights. Meanwhile, the state as an institution is an institution that is responsible for ensuring safety, security, and justice so that there should be no discrimination against all citizens, especially against minorities based on religion, ethnicity, gender, and social groups. Therefore, citizenship is a keyword regarding the emotional bond between citizens and the state in national and state life regardless of ethnic background, religion, or social group.<sup>12</sup> Citizenship is a legal status and an identity. Thus, there is an objective dimension of citizenship: specific rights and obligations which a state invests in its members, and a subjective dimension: a sense of loyalty and belonging. However, objective citizenship does not ensure the existence of subjective citizenship, because "members of groups that feel alienated from their state, perhaps because of social disadvantage or racial discrimination, cannot properly be thought of as 'full citizens', even though they may enjoy a range of formal entitlements"<sup>13</sup>.

The current article intends to discuss the possibilities of cultural citizenship, a citizenship that resides in the community itself in daily life. Concerning how social life practices are performed, how they establish social cohesion with fellow citizens of diverse backgrounds, what

---

<sup>11</sup>Raihani, "Minority Right to Attend Religious Education in Indonesia", *AlJami'ah*, Vol. 53, no. 1 (2015): 1-26, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2015.531.1-26>

<sup>12</sup>A. Heywood, *Political Theory: An Introduction*, London, England: Macmillan, 2004.

<sup>13</sup>Heywood, *Political Theory: An Introduction*, London, England: Macmillan, 2004.

expectations minority groups have of the state in terms of national life, and how the state sees them<sup>14</sup> This article specifically conducted an analysis of the continuity and challenges encountered by religious minority groups. What authentically happened to the religious minority groups on the ground as cultural citizenship. As of present, there have been many kinds of literature discussing religious minority groups, but they are more focused on local religions, their worshipping practices/rituals, and their system of belief. National ideology has not gained much public attention, while it can function as an adhesive between minority groups and Indonesia.

This article focuses on events that transpired in the last five years (2016-2020) concerning the conditions they endured. They had experienced things in the fields of religion, politics, economy, and culture: tradition. We intend to discuss the strong suits that these three minority groups have in fighting for their citizenship rights. This article uses qualitative analytical methods by emphasizing field findings with interviews and literature reviews of articles that match the research theme. The current article is based on field research and interviews with informants. The research was carried out from April to July 2022 with minority groups in Yogyakarta as the subjects. They included followers of Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia, who were interviewed to provide a definition of multicultural citizenship that they experienced in their social environment, and what they felt and experienced.

### **Minority citizenship: power and cultural citizenship**

The religious minority groups, i.e., Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia, which we are discussing are religious groups that have existed for quite some time in Indonesia. Ahmadiyya was founded in Sumatra in 1925

---

<sup>14</sup>Mietzner dan Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation", *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 42, no. 3 (2018), 479-97. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2018.1473335>.

when the missionary Rakhmat Ali came to Indonesia during the rule of the second caliphate of Aceh Kingdom.<sup>15</sup> Sunda Wiwitan was initially disseminated on the 6<sup>th</sup> of October, 1925, in Cigugur, West Java.<sup>16</sup> Shia made its appearance in Indonesia in the 12<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>17</sup>

According to the law, as citizens, members of religious minority groups should be afforded the same rights as members of religious majority groups. They have the right to believe in their creed, conduct their religious rituals or practices, worship, and spread their teachings. However, in practice, minority groups are often discriminated against and persecuted by the majority groups, while the state seems to let them be.<sup>18</sup> The 1945 Constitution, article 29 verse one (1) states that every citizen has the freedom to believe and worship according to his/her belief. Verse two (2) states that every citizen is entitled to equal protection by the state for conducting acts of worship according to his/her belief.

The doctrine provisioned in the 1945 Constitution is still facing a grave challenge. This is because, in practice on the field, there are still numerous actions, attitudes, and expressions not in line with the Constitution. Meanwhile, the state seems powerless in dealing with the small number of perpetrators who claim that they do what they do on behalf of the Indonesian Muslim community. The acts of violence directed against the

---

<sup>15</sup>Arief Muammar, Amroeni Drajat, and Katimin Katimin, "The Relevance of Ali Hasjmy's Thoughts on Islamic Country of Islamic Sharia Implementation in Aceh", *Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal): Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, no. 2 (2019), 228-40.

<sup>16</sup>Nina Mariani, "Ahmadiyah, Conflicts, and Violence in Contemporary Indonesia", *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2013), 1-30.

<sup>17</sup>Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad, "From Power to Cultural Landscapes: Rewriting History of Shi'ah in Aceh", *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2017), 509-30, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2017.11.2.509-530>.

<sup>18</sup>Greg Fealy and Ronit Ricci (Eds.), "Diversity and Its Discontents: An Overview of Minority-Majority Relations in Indonesia", in *Contentious Belonging: The place of Minorities in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2019: 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814843478-005>

Ahmadiyya group in Bogor, the Shia congregations in Lombok, Yogyakarta, and Madura, and the followers of Sunda Wiwitan in Cigugur Bandung, corroborate the reality on the ground that the 1945 Constitution doctrine above has not been optimally implemented. In fact, the perpetrators seem to have been given free reign by the security apparatus-police who did not disperse the throng of masses who were destroying and burning facilities owned by these religious minority groups as well as casting out their members<sup>19</sup>. The state appears incapable of dealing with the paramilitary groups that committed violence against and burned the facilities of Ahmadiyya congregation members in Manislor and Shia followers in Mataram and Madura.<sup>20</sup>

As Haryana, Imam of Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (*Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia* – JAI), stated on the 6<sup>th</sup> of July, 2022;

“It’s a bit difficult for the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation to conduct worship, give education, and carry out social religious activities such as celebrations of Islamic holydays and holding congregations among fellow Ahmadiyya members. There are many obstacles in the form of expressions, statements, hate speech, slanders, acts of violence, and even banishment”.

Haryana’s statement above indicates that JAI’s freedom of religious expression remains shackled, despite the fact that religious freedom is, in theory, guaranteed by the state as provisioned in the 1945 Constitution.<sup>21</sup> The acts of violence committed against JAI in Manislor Tasikmalaya and Parung Bogor have strongly suggest that JAI is considered as a deviant sect by a small population of mainstream Islam in Indonesia. This is a result of the

---

<sup>19</sup>Ahmad Najib Burhani, “It’s a Jihad”: Justifying Violence towards the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia,” *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia*, 2020, 1–14, <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.8>

<sup>20</sup>Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Lessons from Madura”...1-8.

<sup>21</sup>Z. A. Bagir et. al., *Membatasi Tanpa Melanggar: Hak Kebebasan Beragama Atau Berkeyakinan*. Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2019.



Fatwa on Deviance issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (*Majlis Ulama Indonesia* – MUI), which validated the actions of the mainstream groups to accuse the Ahmadiyya Congregation of not being a part of Islam. According to the mainstream Islamic groups, JAI has deviated from the Islamic faith.<sup>22</sup>

However, when there are no political events like general election and regional head elections taking place in Indonesia, conditions of the minority groups seem to calm down. The minority groups live undisturbed by commotions that politicians, religious movement activists, and political buzzers create. It's as if these noise makers do not have the opportunity to set minority groups up as targets of political mobilization engineered by the mainstream majority group.<sup>23</sup> Social media accounts mobilized by political buzzers are also found to be calm and less aggressive in conducting activities that stifle minority groups when they engage in their religious rituals-worship.<sup>24</sup> This shows that Indonesian politics remains polarized along the lines of religion and ideology, which is not productive for the development of democracy<sup>25</sup>. Therefore, in the context of Indonesian politics, there is a correlation between minority groups and political events and uncensored social media.

Regardless of the political issues reported via social media, we can witness various activities carried out by minority groups on the field that serve as examples of no matter the amount of pressure minority groups had to endure, the conduct activities that can be deemed as authentic

---

<sup>22</sup>Z. A. Bagir, "Advocacy for Religious Freedom in Democratizing Indonesia", *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2014), 27–39.

<sup>23</sup>Merlyna Lim, "Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia", *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, no. 2 (2017): 411–427. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1341188>.

<sup>24</sup>Mohamad Atqa, "Religious Expression in Indonesia – A Sociological Study of Ahmadiyya Movement", *OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol. 1, no. 6 (2010), 19–31.

<sup>25</sup>Marcus Mietzner, "Authoritarian Elections, State Capacity, and Performance Legitimacy: Phases of Regime Consolidation and Decline in Suharto's Indonesia", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 39, no. 1 (2018), 83–96, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116687139>

cultural citizenship.<sup>26</sup> Various activities minority groups engage in such as maintaining social relations (*silaturahmi*) with moderate Islamic groups (i.e., Muhammadiyah and NU) and interfaith groups, providing social assistance to residents who are not congregation members of Ahmadiyah, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2019 and continued to 2021, religious minority groups collected donations and gave them to people who were in need, even though they were not members of their congregation.

As Mohammad Safwan, one of the leaders of Shia Imamiah followers, Ahl al-Bayt Indonesia, stated on 7<sup>th</sup> of July, 2022:

“The followers of Shia Ahl al-Bayt, as citizens, although we are often accused as deviants and not aligned with mainstream Islam, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit, we members of the Ahl al-Bayt congregation together collected funds for purchasing basic food products, then we donate them to community members who were impacted by COVID-19. We, Ahl al-Bayt Indonesia, do not differentiate community members when we intend to aid. Whoever is in need, then we will help so that people’s burden can be alleviated during this deadly COVID-19 pandemic that has destroyed our normal way of life.”

The statement made by Muhammad Safwan concerning the involvement of Ahl al-Bayt Indonesia in responding to COVID-19 has proven that religious minority groups are not indifferent to conditions occurring in their surroundings. Minority groups give their attention to their fellow community members, although those impacted by COVID-19 were not members of Ahl al-Bayt Indonesia. Such social activities indicate that the Ahl al-Bayt minority group has no intention of excluding themselves from the community with its diverse beliefs-religious ideologies.<sup>27</sup> Differences of

---

<sup>26</sup>K. Telle, “Vigilante citizenship: Sovereign practices and the politics of insult in Indonesia”, *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land-en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 169 (2013),183–212.

<sup>27</sup>S. Kahn, “Experiences of Faith for Gender Role Non-Conforming Muslims in Resettlement: Preliminary Considerations for Social Work Practitioners”, *The British Journal*

ideologies and beliefs do not hinder efforts to work together in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic, which is considered a humanitarian issue beyond limitations of religious ideology and belief. This is, actually, part of transformative faith that empowers all community members.<sup>28</sup>

It is high time that the state pays full attention to protect religious minority groups with difficulties in having the freedom to perform their rituals of worship. A state established upon a constitution that guarantees its citizens' freedom of religion will be considered to have violated the constitution if said state does not extend protection to minority groups so that they are able to perform their rituals of worship and religious practices calmly and peacefully as other religious followers do.<sup>29</sup> The state should not allow anti-pluralistic religious groups to violate the rights of minority group members on the basis that they are considered deviants and infringe on the foundational faith of the mainstream group. Differences in religious practices and tenets of faith are not to be leveraged to "punish" minority groups that have differing principles of belief.<sup>30</sup> This opposes the principle of respecting diverse beliefs and ideologies followed by varying religious followers throughout Indonesia. Principles that show respect and allow minority groups to conduct worship and believe in their creed are matters that leave no room for anyone, particularly the majority groups, to discuss.

An example of the difficulty in establishing a place of worship was experienced by the Sunda Wiwitan group, as mentioned by Ki Demang Nur Wahid, 12 June 2022:

---

*of Social Work*, Vol. 45, No. 7 (2015), 2038–2055.

<sup>28</sup>Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Between Social Services and Tolerance: Explaining Religious Dynamics in Muhammadiyah", *Between Social Services and Tolerance*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814881128-003>

<sup>29</sup>Mark Woodward, "Reflections on Java and Islam 1979-2010", *Al-Jami'ah*, Vol. 49, no. 2 (2011), 281–294.

<sup>30</sup>Robert W. Hefner, "Modernity and the Challenge of Pluralism: Some Indonesian Lessons", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 2, no. 4 (1995): 21-45.

“We, the adherents, and followers of Sunda Wiwitan, have difficulty in worshipping at places where there are many salafi-wahabi Islamic majority groups. The reason is we, the adherents, and followers of Sunda Wiwitan, are considered neither a religion nor a belief. We are simply seen as a stream of belief that requires no attention from the state as it is not a part of religion. There was a time when Sunda Wiwitan’s place of worship was destroyed by irresponsible individuals. But the security forces seem to have let it be”.

In practice, minority groups run into severe obstacles put up by groups that disagree with their religious practices. The recognition of minority groups by majority groups in terms of citizenship rights such as political rights, cultural rights, and social recognition are still hampered by discriminatory attitudes shown by government apparatuses<sup>31</sup>. It is difficult for the state to register minority group members’ citizenship because of threats made by the anti-religious minority group, as is the case with the minority group in Sweden <sup>32</sup> Even politicians do not recognize and accommodate the needs of minority groups in political participation for fear of not being able to secure votes in the local political process<sup>33</sup>. Given such circumstances, the greatest challenge minority groups face comes from majority groups that are anti-diversity of religious practices, politicians who take advantage of the majority groups for political support, and security forces who behave exclusively leading to the practice of discriminatory political policies.

---

<sup>31</sup>Aspinall et al., “Elites, Masses, and Democratic Decline in Indonesia”, *Democratization*, Vol. 27, no. 4 (2020): 505–26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1680971>.

<sup>32</sup>Tommaso M. Milani, Simon Bauer, Marie Carlson, Andrea Spehar, and Kerstin Von Bromssen, “Citizenship as Status , Habitus and Acts : Language Requirements and Civic Orientation in Sweden”, *Citizenship Studies*, 25, no. 3 (2021), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2021.1968698>.

<sup>33</sup>Mietzner, “Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism”, *Democratization*, Vol. 27, no. 6 (2020): 1021–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1704266>.

In essence, it is not easy for minority groups in Indonesia, a state grounded on the principles of Pancasila, to practice religious activities as the majority groups do. Minority groups endure immense pressure exerted by majority groups that oppose liberal democracy and the right to religious freedom. It appears as if the minority groups are held captive by payers/suppliers of wealth (money) for religious thugs, like militias (religious paramilitary) and political party thugs.<sup>34</sup> Minority groups also have a very weak position before the national law because law enforcers are often threatened by those who refuse to accept minority groups. Reinforcing the public's understanding of human rights so that they would not be easily provoked to commit violent acts against minority groups is a point that needs to be considered.<sup>35</sup> Security forces, government apparatuses as public service providers also need to enhance their understanding of the obligation to protect all citizens regardless of their religious background.<sup>36</sup> This is, in fact, a standpoint wherein minority groups will encounter obstacles from the authority: we are still waiting to see whether the state/government can protect, alter the orientation of security forces and civilians to have a nondiscriminatory understanding of and take nondiscriminatory actions on minority groups.

### **Citizenship and contemporary Indonesian Islam**

As a country where much of the population is Muslim, reaching 87.7% of Indonesia's total 274 million population in 2020, the position of minority groups is heavily influenced by the Muslim community. While as we know,

---

<sup>34</sup>V. R. Hadiz, "Political Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia", *CRISE (Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity)*, no. 74 (2010): 39.

<sup>35</sup>Jeremy Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 56, no. 3 (2014): 591-621. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000267>.

<sup>36</sup>Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316344446>.

the Indonesian Muslim population is made up of many variations: from the progressive, conservative, Salafi, and even the fundamentalist<sup>37</sup>. Martin suggests that since the year 2000, a conservative power has developed and flourished in Indonesia, and it has been affecting socio-religious life and even national politics<sup>38</sup>. The minority groups are quite concerned if the conservative Islam group were to continue developing, Indonesia would no longer become a country that is inclusive of other beliefs and religious diversity. Indonesia will be kept hostage within a state of religion-based violence and intolerance.<sup>39</sup>

In theory and concept, Muslims in Indonesia are a democratic, tolerant, and moderate community, which is why a civilized democracy is expected to thrive and develop. A democracy that emphasizes on respecting religious minority groups despite their differences with most of the Indonesian Muslim community.<sup>40</sup> But it does not mean that there are no challenges posed by the majority groups against the minority groups, which are often considered “deviants” and straying away from Islam. Various ideas on appreciating diversity, respecting their right to worship in a different manner, and allowing minority groups to uphold their belief, are often struck by forces that have intolerant and non-pluralistic religious understanding.<sup>41</sup> This occurs as a result of the spread of fundamentalist-

---

<sup>37</sup>Martin van Bruinessen, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 10, no. 2 (2002): 117–54, <https://doi.org/10.5367/000000002101297035>.

<sup>38</sup>Martin Van Bruinessen, *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2013.

<sup>39</sup>Kennedy, McKee, and King, “Islamist Insurgency and the War against Polio: A Cross-National Analysis of the Political Determinants of Polio”, *Globalization and Health*, Vol. 11, No. 40 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-015-0123>

<sup>40</sup>Robert W. Hefner “Religious Resurgence in Contemporary Asia : Southeast Asian Perspectives on Capitalism, the State, and the New Piety Source”, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol . 69 , No. 4 (2016): 1031–47.

<sup>41</sup>Robert W. Hefner, *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia*, *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia*, London: Routledge, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315628837>.

radical oriented Islamic ideologies at campuses and Islamic forums that are conducted directly in-person or via social media.<sup>42</sup>

Such a situation surely affects the mentality of minority groups that hang their hopes on Indonesia's moderate Islam groups. Consequently, if Muhammadiyah-NU are unable to spearhead the advocacy and promotion of moderate Islam in Indonesia, then it is feared that Indonesia will plunge toward conservatism and extremism since the moderate forces would have been defeated by the conservative-extremist groups who do not hesitate to evict, destroy, and persecute against minority groups they consider deviants that have strayed from the Islamic faith.<sup>43</sup> The description above refers to the theoretical and conceptual issues regarding the advent of Islamic groups campaigning for a dialogue-oriented, inclusive, and moderate Islam coming face to face with the exclusive-salafi minority groups, which developed from 2017 to 2021 in Indonesia. The period of 2021-2024 can be considered a serious stake, whether the moderate Islam groups will win the contestation over Indonesia's political public space or will they experience setbacks or even be significantly defeated by the conservative-Salafi-extremist groups.

Despite the majority of Indonesia's Muslim community being moderates, there are a small few who are Salafi radical, and even extremists, who promote acts of violence committed by violent extremist groups.<sup>44</sup> As shown in the data published by Setara Institute and the Wahid Institute

---

<sup>42</sup>IPAC, "Online Activism and Social Media", *IPAC*, no. 24 (2015): 1-25.

<sup>43</sup>Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom", *Irasec's Discussion Papers*, no. 12 (2011): 1-26; Syafiq Hasyim, "Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Pluralism in Indonesia," *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol. 41, no. 4-5 (2015): 487-95, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453714566547>.

<sup>44</sup>Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*, Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2006; Noorhaidi Hasan, "Religious Diversity and Blasphemy Law: Understanding Growing Religious Conflict and Intolerance in Post-Suharto Indonesia, *al-Jamiah Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2017): 105-26. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.551.105-126>.

in 2018 concerning groups that promote violence.<sup>45</sup> Hence, violent extremism is the most actual challenge that moderate Islam groups must encounter while spreading their ideas of inclusivism, tolerance, and Islamic moderation in Indonesia. This issue will indirectly threaten the Jokowi-Amin administration in the next three years (2022-2024). If the Jokowi-Amin administration is incapable of controlling extremist groups, then democracy and the basic human rights of minorities will be at risk of a democratic stagnancy and setback.<sup>46</sup>

As the population majority, the Muslim community in Indonesia, particularly the mainstream Islam groups, supports Pancasila as the national principle. The mainstream Muslim community has no intention of replacing Pancasila with other principles. This is because mainstream Islam considers Pancasila in line with Islamic values, not a single one of the principles in Pancasila opposes the values of Islam.<sup>47</sup> A number of experts even argue that Pancasila is an implementation of Islamic values. Although there had been ideas from a group of Islamic politicians pushing for Indonesia to revisit the Jakarta Charter, but it did not go well. This was because Islamic social organizations like Muhammadiyah, NU, Persis, Nahlatul Waton (NW), Sarekat Islam (SI) did not support Indonesia to reintroduce the Jakarta Charter as a national principle.<sup>48</sup> Eventually, the idea to return to the Jakarta Charter had waned along with the passing of time and the constantly shifting

---

<sup>45</sup>Noorhaidi Hasan, "Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto", *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (2018): 23-51, <https://doi.org/10.14203/jissh.v1i1.2>.

<sup>46</sup>Marcus Mietzner, "Rival Populisms and the Democratic Crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and Technocrats", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 74, no. 4 (2020): 420-438. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426>.

<sup>47</sup>Haedar Nashir et al., "Muhammadiyah's Moderation Stance in The 2019 General Election," *al-Jamiah Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2019), 1-24.

<sup>48</sup>Leonard C. Sebastian and Alexander R Arifianto, "From Civil Islam towards NKRI Bersyariah? Understanding Rising Islamism in Post-Reformasi Indonesia", *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR)*, Volume 129 (2017), 301-16, <https://doi.org/10.2991/icsps-17.2018.65>



political waves. It can, thus, be understood that the Muslim community in Indonesia prefer the substantive implementation of Islamic values rather than Islamic formalization in public spaces.

In addition to supporting Pancasila as a national principle, the Indonesian Muslim community pays attention to the enforcement of human rights that fellow citizens experience. To members of religious minority groups like Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia, the mainstream Islam groups encourage their being protected by the state and security forces<sup>49</sup>. The Indonesian Muslim community disagrees with various acts of violence and crime committed against minority groups, despite their having a different belief from the Indonesian Islamic majority groups.<sup>50</sup> The mainstream Muslim groups support law enforcement institutions to take appropriate measures against those who destroy facilities, murder, and evict members of religious minority groups, egregious actions that still continue throughout Indonesia. The Mainstream Muslim community has even demanded that the state apply strict measures to perpetrators who destroy, riot, and create trouble against minority groups by sending them to the court of law and punishing them for the crimes they committed.<sup>51</sup>

The things that the Muslim community has done in the context of citizenship can be considered a kind of progress for Islam in Indonesia, which is more respectful of humanity. Injustice to the citizenry is unwanted because people aspire to achieve justice for all citizens. The political processes implemented by the state have greater support from the majority of the Muslim community than those who rejected the general or regional

---

<sup>49</sup>Moch Nur Ichwan, "The Making of a Pancasila State: Political Debates on Secularism, Islam and the State in Indonesia", *SOIAS research paper series*, Vol. 6 (2012): 1-54..

<sup>50</sup>David Kloos, "The Saliency of Gender: Female Islamic Authority in Aceh, Indonesia", *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 40, no. 4 (2016): 527-44.

<sup>51</sup>Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Pluralism, Liberalism and Islamism: Religious Outlook of Muhammadiyah Ahmad", *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 25, no. 3 (2018): 433-70, <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.15408/sdi.v25i3.7765>.

head elections.<sup>52</sup> Muhammadiyah-NU and other organizations pay close attention to Indonesia's impoverished population. There is no dispute in defending the poor so that they are afforded the social justice they deserve as stipulated in the Fifth or Regional Head Elections Principle of Pancasila: Social justice for all the people of Indonesia.<sup>53</sup>

However, despite the various efforts made by the mainstream Muslim community to support religious diversity, and not to discriminate against religious minority groups, not to persecute, evict, and commit acts of violence against them, facts on the ground show otherwise. That is why, in the next five years, namely in 2025, religious minority groups will still be discriminated against. Acts of violence and persecution by anti-religious pluralist groups may continue. It seems that religious minority groups are concerned about their being able to carry out the religious rituals and da'wah they usually do. The most obvious challenge that will persist in the next five years is the potential mobilization of religious issues in Indonesian politics. The intolerant and anti-pluralism Islamic groups with the support of Islamic paramilitaries such as FPI, the Islamic Jihad Front (*Front Jihad Islam*), the Indonesian Anti Shia Alliance (*Aliansi Anti Shiah Indonesia*), the Faith Defender Forum (*Forum Pembela Akidah*), and the likes will continue to intimidate minority groups during general elections or regional head elections.

### **Cultural citizenship and cultural Right: challenge and opportunity**

Numerous cultural citizenship practices mentioned in other parts of the current article are authentic rights that have developed in the community.

---

<sup>52</sup>Edward Aspinall and Noor Rohman, "Village Head Elections in Java: Money Politics and Brokerage in the Remaking of Indonesia's Rural Elite", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 1 (2017): 31-52. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463416000461>.

<sup>53</sup>David Dempsey, "The Path to Social Justice Goes through Politics and Economics." *Journal of Policy Practice*, Vol. 7, no. 2-3 (2008): 94-105. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15588740801937888.2008>

They can create mechanisms of social cohesion, social recognition, and social harmony.<sup>54</sup> However, as minorities, the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia still seem to be discriminated while striving to obtain their citizenship rights. JAI, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia often had to endure various discriminatory treatment because they were not considered in line with the teachings of Islam, which led to the demand that they no longer use Islam as the basis of their teachings or simply admit Islam as their religion instead.

Cultural citizenship shown by the minority groups in their efforts to establish relationships and understanding with other Muslims has gained the attention of the Indonesian Muslim majority, like Muhammadiyah-NU, particularly in relation to humanitarian activities. However, there is a small group in Islam that rejects such initiatives, and they even provoke other Islamic majority groups to reject activities conducted by religious minority groups, i.e., Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia, based on the suspicion that they are secretly inviting Muslims to become members of their congregation<sup>55</sup>. The intolerant and anti-pluralistic groups accuse the minority groups of concealing their true mission from the majority groups. As stated by a member of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation, AS, on 13 July 2021:

“We are often accused of concealing the true mission of the Ahmadiyya Congregation by conducting humanitarian activities such as supporting orphans, the poor, and abandoned children. In fact, on several occasions, the Ahmadiyya Congregation office has been destroyed, and the humanitarian activities that the Ahmadiyya Congregation conducted were dismantled. But we did not resist and let them be. They accuse

---

<sup>54</sup>Saleena Saleem, “State Use of Public Order and Social Cohesion Concerns in the Securitisation of Non-Mainstream Muslims in Malaysia”, *Journal of Religious and Political Practice*, Vol. 4, no. 3 (2018), 314-335.

<sup>55</sup>Umar Faruk Assegaf, “The Rise of Shi’ism in Contemporary Indonesia : Orientation And Affiliation”, Theses, The Australian National University, 2012. DOI 10.25911/5d5e7847f1016

us of hiding behind humanitarian activities because they do not understand the true teachings of Ahmadiyya”.

Political rights, cultural rights, and the right to freedom of worship are extremely difficult things for minority groups of Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia to obtain in Indonesia’s political practice.<sup>56</sup> These three groups are often discriminated against when political campaigns occur. Participants of campaigns held by one of the political parties contesting in elections had frequently committed acts of violence against these groups. And when acts of violence were committed against the three groups, security forces often seemed to condone them.<sup>57</sup> This leads to what is known as condonement politics, which gives the impression of perpetuating – continuous violence – against these three religious minority groups. If we explore further, what these three groups have to deal with refers to their being deprived of political rights, cultural rights, and the right to freedom of belief-worship. The difficulty these groups experience indicates a point of concern over a country that is based on Pancasila and highly pluralistic in terms of worshipping and religious practices.

It seems that threats from anti-Pancasila groups affiliated with Wahabi Salafi forces will continue to hamper the efforts made by Indonesia and the moderate majority groups in building a just and democratic political climate.<sup>58</sup> Additionally, the majority groups are also hindered in their attempt to develop the ideas and practices of moderate Islam. Moderate Islam is thwarted by intolerant forces that tend to force their opinions upon others, and they even have no hesitation in resorting to violence while conducting

---

<sup>56</sup>Christian S. Hammons, “Indigenous Religion, Christianity and the State: Mobility and Nomadic Metaphysics in Siberut, Western Indonesia”, *Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 17, no. 5 (2016): 399–418. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14442213.2016.1208676>.

<sup>57</sup>Melissa A. Crouch, “Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law”, *Asian Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 7 (2012), 1-46.

<sup>58</sup>Ricardi S. Adnan, “Indonesia: Challenges and Hopes of Reformation As a State and Society”, *Journal of Social Sciences & Interdisciplinary Research*, Vol. 2no. 3 (2013), 85–106.

their political activities.<sup>59</sup> Extremist groups utilize terror ideology by carrying out the terror of hatred via social media and mass mobilization in public venues.<sup>60</sup> This is undoubtedly a grave threat to Jokowi-Amin's administration in their attempt to develop a democratic political tradition and encourage moderate Islam through Muhammadiyah-NU.

The presence of groups that are against tolerance and Pancasila democracy has resulted in the development of inclusive religious behavior among the Indonesian Muslim majority. It seems that this is brought about by the massive dissemination of da'wah (Islamic missionary work) via social media that is dominated by the exclusive-intolerant minority groups.<sup>61</sup> In the meantime, the inclusive majority groups have not taken massive measures to take advantage of social media. At the end of the day, social media has been seized by exclusive, intolerant, and even extremist minority groups. This, consequently, has an impact on the copious amount of hate speeches, insults, and slanders circulating on social media, which has become a portal for any Islam-related matters that are easily accessible and free of any censorship. Today is an era in which Islamic da'wah truly becomes one of the challenges that the moderate Islam majority groups need to address.

In the future, Indonesia, as a pluralistic country, should not condone the behaviors of intolerant and exclusive minority groups that do not respect religious pluralism. The state must ensure that the law is enforced equally on any members of the society as a key element in recognizing

---

<sup>59</sup>Masdar Hilmy, "Whither Indonesia's Islamic Moderatism? A Reexamination on the Moderate Vision of Muhammadiyah and NU", *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2013), 24-48.

<sup>60</sup>Marcus Mietzner, "Indonesia's Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Resilient Civil Society", *Democratization*, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2012), 209-29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.572620>.

<sup>61</sup>Ben Bland, "Politics in Indonesia: Resilient Elections, Defective Democracy", CIAO, Number 04, (2019), 1-10.

Indonesia's democratic political system, considering respect to basic human rights, and equality for all citizens. Security forces, moderate Islamic elites or figures, moderate religious organizations, and civil society activists-defenders of human rights and democracy should pay due attention to the behaviors of these pro acts of violence, anti-pluralism, and anti-tolerance Muslim minority groups. The reason for this is that If all actions against pluralism continue to persist, then Indonesia, a state based on Pancasila democracy with its unique moderate Islam ideology, will be dubbed as an anti-democratic state that violates basic human rights.

It is high time that the state confers minority groups the right to practice their religious rituals freely, independently, without intimidation, persecution, and with acts of violence directed against them.<sup>62</sup> Additionally, the state should also strictly enforce the law and punish rioters and troublemakers targeting minority groups, without hiding behind the argument that if the state were to take strict measures against rioters, then the state would be violating human rights.<sup>63</sup> The state cannot condone acts of violence and intimidations against minority groups to persist because these are criminal acts and they violate human rights and the religious freedom, which is guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>64</sup> The minority groups' expression of faith, expression of politics and culture are not grounds for punishment simply because their actions contradict the belief and faith of the Muslim majority groups.

Theoretically, minority citizenship still presents a puzzle because studies on minority citizenship are mostly seen from the political perspective

---

<sup>62</sup>Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Between Social Services and Tolerance: Explaining Religious Dynamics in Muhammadiyah: Between Social Services and Tolerance", ISEAS, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814881128-003>.

<sup>63</sup>H.A. Hellyer, *The Islamic tradition and the human rights discourse*, Washington: Atlantic Council, 2018.

<sup>64</sup>Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom", *Irasec's Discussion Papers*, no. 12 (2011): 1-26

of state recognition of citizens. In future developments, citizenship of religious minorities, ethnic groups and social groups will become a cultural study so that differences in religion, ethnicity and social groups are not connected to religious norms which often limit group activities because of the beliefs held by one group, especially the majority group so that judging minority groups as citizens who do not comply with religious teachings, therefore, needs to receive the attention of the state, namely the need for “development” or if they are not satisfied, they must disband forcibly through regulations or laws. Even forced dissolution often comes from the majority group who feel they are the “guardians of the faith” of citizens.

## **Conclusion**

This article reflects to the public that minority groups have multicultural citizenship rights developing authentically, e.g., maintaining social harmony, social recognition, and concern about humanitarian issues. Nevertheless, religious minority groups, namely Ahmadiyya, Sunda Wiwitan, and Shia in Indonesia have, to this day, still been experiencing discriminatory actions and treatments. Acts of hatred, eviction, and violence perpetrated by the Wahabism and Salafism majority groups with their intolerant and anti-pluralistic behavior against the three minority groups have often been condoned by state apparatuses. The state even seems powerless given the various acts of violence committed by the intolerant groups. The greatest challenge that the state after (Jokowi-Amin) will face in the coming three years (2022-2024) and leading up to the Presidential Election, which will determine the new president of Indonesia, refers to various actions indicating Indonesia as a human rights violator against religious minority groups and religious freedom.

Additionally, this poses a serious challenge for moderate Islamic social organizations, namely Muhammadiyah-NU, in their efforts to promote

and develop a non-violent, inclusive, and moderate Islam ideology because the intolerant, exclusive, and extremist groups have taken advantage of social media on a massive scale to promote their ideology. In this regard, Muhammadiyah-NU is truly tested whether the idea of moderate Islam can truly curb the surge of extremism, Salafism, and Wahabism, which have secured opportunities to be present among some of the Islamic elites and political elites, particularly during periods leading up to the General Election or the Regional Head Elections.

### **Acknowledgment**

This article was prepared by conducting research involving several individuals of which the authors are grateful for, including Dr. Mega Hidayati, who has extended her criticism on the preliminary draft of the article's analysis; Dr. Hasse J, who has provided his input to include some analyses relating to the minority group, which is the focus of study in this article; and the authors would also like to express our gratitude to Prof. Sunyoto Usman for his criticism on the explanatory framework employed in the current article.

### **Bibliography**

- Adnan, Ricardi S., "Indonesia: Challenges and Hopes of Reformation As a State and Society", *Journal of Social Sciences & Interdisciplinary Research*, Vol. 2, no. 3 (2013): 85-106.
- Aspinall, Edward, Diego Fossati, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, and Eve Warburton, "Elites, Masses, and Democratic Decline in Indonesia", *Democratization*, Vol. 27, no. 4 (2020): 505-26. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1680971>.
- Aspinall, Edward, and Noor Rohman, "Village Head Elections in Java: Money Politics and Brokerage in the Remaking of Indonesia's Rural Elite", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, no. 1 (2017): 31-52.



<https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463416000461>.

- Assegaf, Umar Faruk, “The Rise of Shi’ism in Contemporary Indonesia : Orientation And Affiliation”, Theses, The Australian National University, 2012. DOI 10.25911/5d5e7847f1016.
- Atqa, Mohamad, “Religious Expression in Indonesia – A Sociological Study of Ahmadiyya Movement”, *OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Vol. 1, no. 6 (2010): 19–31.
- Bagir, Zainal Abidin, “Advocacy for Religious Freedom in Democratizing Indonesia”, *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, Vol. 12, no. 4 (2014): 27–39.
- Bagir, Zainal Abidin, and et.al. *Membatasi Tanpa Melanggar: Hak Kebebasan Beragama Atau Berkeyakinan*. Yogyakarta: Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2019.
- Bland, Ben, “Politics in Indonesia: Resilient Elections, Defective Democracy” *CIAO*, no. 4 (2019): 1-10.
- Bruinessen, Martin van, “Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia”, *South East Asia Research*, Vol. 10, no. 2 (2002): 117–54. <https://doi.org/10.5367/000000002101297035>.
- Bruinessen, Martin Van. *Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam : Explaining the ‘ Conservative Turn*. Singapore: ISEAS, 2013.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib, “Between Social Services and Tolerance: Explaining Religious Dynamics in Muhammadiyah”, *Between Social Services and Tolerance*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814881128-003>.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib, “Geertz’s Trichotomy of Abangan, Santri, and Priyayi Controversy and Continuity”, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2017): 329–50. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2017.11.2.329-350>.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib, “It’s a Jihad”: Justifying Violence towards the

- Ahmadiyya in Indonesia.” *TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 2020: 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2020.8>.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib, “Lessons from Madura: NU, Conservatism and the 2019 Presidential Election”, *Perspective*, no. 72 (2019): 1–9.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib, “Pluralism, Liberalism, and Islamism: Religious Outlook of Muhammadiyah”, *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 25, no. 3 (2018): 433–70. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v25i3.7765>.
- Burhani, Ahmad Najib, “Torn between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: Discussing Erfaan Dahlan’s Religious Affiliation and Self-Exile”, *Indonesia and the Malay World*, Vol. 48, no. 140 (2020): 60–77. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13639811.2019.1663678>.
- Bustamam-Ahmad, Kamaruzzaman, “From Power to Cultural Landscapes: Rewriting History of Shi‘ah in Aceh”, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2017): 509–30. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2017.11.2.509-530>.
- Colbran, Nicola, “Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia”, *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Vol. 14, no. 5 (2010): 678–704.
- Crouch, Melissa A., “Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law”, *Asian Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 7 (2012), 1-46.
- Dempsey, David. “The Path to Social Justice Goes through Politics and Economics.” *Journal of Policy Practice* 7, no. 2–3 (2008): 94–105. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15588740801937888>.
- Fealy, Greg, and Ronit Ricci, “Diversity and Its Discontents: An Overview of Minority–Majority Relations in Indonesia”, in *Contentious Belonging: The place of Minorities in Indonesia*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2019: 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814843478-005>
- Hadiz, Vedi R., “Indonesia’s Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New

- Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?”, *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 53, no. 3 (2017): 261–78.
- Hadiz, Vedi R., “Political Islam in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia.” *CRISE (Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity)*, no. 74 (2010): 39.
- Hammons, Christian S., “Indigenous Religion, Christianity and the State: Mobility and Nomadic Metaphysics in Siberut, Western Indonesia”, *Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology*, Vol. 17, no. 5 (2016): 399–418. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14442213.2016.1208676>.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi. *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, 2006.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto.” *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol. 1, no. 1 (2018): 23–51. <https://doi.org/10.14203/jissh.v1i1.2>.
- Hasan, Noorhaidi, “Religious Diversity and Blasphemy Law: Understanding Growing Religious Conflict and Intolerance in Post-Suharto Indonesia, *alJamiah Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2017): 105–26. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.551.105-126>.
- Hasyim, Syafiq, “Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Pluralism in Indonesia”, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol. 41, no. 4–5 (2015): 487–95. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453714566547>.
- Hasyim, Syafiq, “The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom”, *Irasec’s Discussion Papers*, no. 12 (2011): 1–26.
- Hefner, Robert W. *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia*. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia. London: Routledge, 2018. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315628837>.
- Hefner, Robert W., “The Study of Religious Freedom in Indonesia.” *Review*

- of Faith and International Affairs*, Vol. 11, no. 2 (2013): 18–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2013.808038>.
- Hefner, Robert W., “Modernity and the Challenge of Pluralism: Some Indonesian Lessons”, *Studia Islamika*, Vol. 2, no. 4 (1995): 21-45.
- Hefner, Robert W., “Religious Resurgence in Contemporary Asia: Southeast Asian Perspectives on Capitalism, the State, and the New Piety Source”, *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (2016): 1031-1047.
- Hellyer, H.A. *The Islamic Tradition and the Human Rights Discourse*. Washington: Atlantic Council, 2018.
- Heywood, A. *Political Theory: An Introduction*. Second. London, England: macmillan, 2004.
- Hilmy, Masdar, “Whither Indonesia’s Islamic Moderatism? A Reexamination on the Moderate Vision of Muhammadiyah and NU”, *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2013): 24-48.
- Ichwan, Moch Nur, “The Making of a Pancasila State: Political Debates on Secularism, Islam and the State in Indonesia”, *SOIAS research paper series*, Vol. 6 (2012): 1-54.
- IPAC. “Online Activism and Social Media.” *Ipac*, no. 24 (2015): 1–25.
- Kahn, S., “Experiences of Faith for Gender Role Non-Conforming Muslims in Resettlement: Preliminary Considerations for Social Work Practitioners”, *The British Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 45, No. 7 (2015), 2038–2055.
- Kennedy, Jonathan, Martin McKee, and Lawrence King, “Islamist Insurgency and the War against Polio: A Cross-National Analysis of the Political Determinants of Polio”, *Globalization and Health*, Vol. 11, no. 40 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-015-0123>
- Kloos, David, “The Saliency of Gender: Female Islamic Authority in Aceh, Indonesia.” *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 40, no. 4 (2016): 527–44.

- Lim, Merlyna, "Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia", *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, no. 3 (July 2017): 411–27. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1341188>.
- Mariani, Nina, "Ahmadiyah, Conflicts, and Violence in Contemporary Indonesia", *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2013):1-30.
- Menchik, Jeremy. *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism*. Cambridge University Press, 2016. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316344446>.
- Menchik, Jeremy. "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 56, no. 3 (2014): 591–621. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000267>.
- Mietzner, Marcus, "Authoritarian Elections, State Capacity, and Performance Legitimacy: Phases of Regime Consolidation and Decline in Suharto's Indonesia", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 39, no. 1 (2018): 83–96. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116687139>.
- Mietzner, Marcus, "Authoritarian Innovations in Indonesia: Electoral Narrowing, Identity Politics and Executive Illiberalism", *Democratization*, Vol. 27, no. 6 (2020): 1021–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1704266>.
- Mietzner, Marcus, "Indonesia's Democratic Stagnation: Anti-Reformist Elites and Resilient Civil Society", *Democratization*, Vol. 19, no. 2 (2012): 209–29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.572620>.
- Mietzner, Marcus, "Rival Populisms and the Democratic Crisis in Indonesia: Chauvinists, Islamists and Technocrats", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 74, no. 4 (2020): 420–438. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2020.1725426>.
- Mietzner, Marcus, and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016

- Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation”, *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 42, no. 3 (2018): 479–97. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2018.1473335>.
- Milani, Tommaso M., Simon Bauer, Marie Carlson, Andrea Spehar, and Kerstin Von Bromssen, “Citizenship as Status, Habitus and Acts : Language Requirements and Civic Orientation in Sweden”, *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 25, no. 3 (2021): 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2021.1968698>.
- Muammar, Arief, Amroeni Drajat, and Katimin Katimin, “The Relevance of Ali Hasjmy’s Thoughts on Islamic Country of Islamic Sharia Implementation in Aceh”, *Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal): Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, no. 2 (2019): 228–40.
- Muhtadi, Burhanuddin. *Vote Buying in Indonesia The Mechanics of Electoral Bribery*. London: Pilgrave MacMillan, 2019.
- Nashir, Haedar, Zuly Qodir, Achmad Nurmandi, Hasse Jubba, and Mega Hidayati, “Muhammadiyah’s Moderation Stance in The 2019 General Election”, *al-Jamiah Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (2019): 1-24.
- Raihani, “Minority Right to Attend Religious Education in Indonesia”, *AlJami’ah*, Vol. 53, no. 1 (2016): 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2015.531.1-26>.
- Saat, Norshahril and Ahmad Najib Burhani (eds.), *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2020.
- Saleem, Saleena, “State Use of Public Order and Social Cohesion Concerns in the Securitisation of Non-Mainstream Muslims in Malaysia”, *Journal of Religious and Political Practice*, Vol. 4, no. 3 (2018): 314-335.

- Sebastian, Leonard C, and Alexander R Arifianto, “From Civil Islam towards NKRI Bersyariah? Understanding Rising Islamism in Post-Reformasi Indonesia”, *Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research (ASSEHR)*, Volume 129 (2017): 301–16. <https://doi.org/10.2991/icsps-17.2018.65>.
- Siddik, Syahril, “The Origin of the Indonesian Blasphemy Law and Its Implication towards Religious Freedom in Indonesia The Origin of the Indonesian Blasphemy Law and Its Implication towards Religious”, *Tebuireng: Journal of Islamic Studies and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2022): 17-33
- Telle, Kari, “Vigilante Citizenship: Sovereign Practices and the Politics of Insult in Indonesia”, *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land-en Volkenkunde*, Vol. 169 (2013):183-212.
- Woodward, Mark, “Reflections on Java and Islam 1979-2010”, *AlJami’ah*, Vol. 49, no. 2 (2011): 281–294.